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ABSTRACT 
Singapore, as a newborn country in the mid-1960s, was economically, politically, 
and strategically unviable on its own. However, despite its humble start, Singapore has 
built the most well-equipped military in Southeast Asia. While neighboring countries had 
similar governmental apparatuses and economic-political situations, only Singapore 
managed to modernize its armed forces at a significant rate and achieve a remarkable 
result. 
Thus, this situation raises the following question: what method has enabled 
Singapore to modernize its military successfully? Drawing from the broader Singapore 
military studies and business and management strategies literature, this thesis finds that 
during the early stages, Singapore implemented predefined situation-based 
development—strategic planning—assisted by Israeli military advisers. In the next stage, 
thanks to its heavy investment in training and education, Singapore started to 
cultivate innovation in its military personnel, which increased its modernization pace, 
while still implementing strategic planning. In the current stage, Singapore’s military 
modernization pace is barely challenged regionally, propelled by thriving 
innovation due to its establishment of dedicated organizations that act as 
innovation engines. Overall, Singapore’s achievement was not brought about by 
strategic planning or innovation institutionalization alone but by the proper 
combination of the two. 
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This thesis answers the question: what are the main factors which explain 
Singapore’s success in modernizing its military within the span of fifty years, from the 
mid-1960s to the mid-2010s? 
Singapore is an island city-state at the tip of the Malayan peninsula, surrounded by 
two larger Malay Muslim–dominated states, Malaysia and Indonesia, as shown in Figure 
1. Singapore has a territory about 3.5 times bigger than Washington, DC, and is populated 
by around six million people.1  
 
Figure 1. Singapore Location2 
This island city-state was powerless, vulnerable, and struggled with its social, 
political, and economic problems as a newborn country in the mid-1960s. Singapore was 
 
1 “The-world-factbook-singapore,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed September 11, 2019 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html/ 
2 Adapted from Whiddon, L., Weldon Owen Inc Staff, Barnes & Noble Books, and Weldon Owen Pty 
Limited. The Illustrated World Atlas. Barnes & Noble, Incorporated, 2004. 
2 
economically, politically, and strategically unviable on its own.3 In addition, the premature 
withdrawal of British colonial forces, in the early 1970s, made Singapore near defenseless 
and more vulnerable against internal and external threats.  
Despite its humble start and history of relying on its meager military resources,4 
Singapore operates the most reliable air force and the most modern navy in Southeast Asia5 
and a robust, well-equipped army. As ranked by Military Balance in 2019, the SAF are the 
best-equipped military in Southeast Asia,6 manned by well-trained personnel and, as 
characterized by Eliot Cohen, “molded a technologically sophisticated and large military 
that is capable of striking far from the island state.”7 The Military Balance 2019 also 
mentioned that the modern Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are backed by 72,500 regular 
military personnel along with 312,500 reservists.8 For decades, the island-city state has 
positioned itself as the region’s biggest defense spender. In 2018, the Singaporean 
government allocated around US$10.8 billion for its annual defense budget.9 That annual 
defense budget even surpassed the defense budget of the region’s biggest economy, 
Indonesia, which allocated an annual defense budget of about US$7.4 billion, and Thailand 
in third place at around US$6.8 billion.10 
 
3 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (New South Wales, 
Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2003), 2. 
4 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 10. 
5 Ben Brimelow, “How a city-state became a military powerhouse with the best air force and navy in 
the Southeast Asia” Business Insider, last modified April 8, 2018. 
https://www.businessinsider.com/singapore-military-best-air-force-navy-southeast-asia-2018-4 
6 Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia.” The Military Balance 119, no. 1 (February 1, 
2019): 303. https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1561032. 
7 Cited in Evan A. Laksmana, “Threats and Civil-Military Relations: Explaining Singapore’s ‘Trickle 
down’ Military Innovation.” Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 347–65. 
8 Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia,” 303.  
9 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Fact sheet—Trends in World Military 
Expenditure, 2018,” accessed April 25, 2019, 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932
018%20in%20constant%20%282017%29%20USD%20%28pdf%29.pdf. 
10 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Fact sheet—Trends in World Military 
Expenditure, 2018.” 
3 
Singapore has thus succeeded in transforming its armed forces, from only two 
infantry battalions into the most capable and modern in the region, within the span of a 
mere four decades. The SAF, helped by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), has continuously 
innovated since the 1960s—technologically, organizationally, and conceptually.11 But 
what is particularly peculiar about Singapore’s achievement in modernizing its military is 
that, while neighboring countries had similar governmental apparatuses, with only slightly 
different initial economic-political situations, only Singapore managed to modernize its 
armed forces at a significant rate and achieve a remarkable result—an issue that has 
received little attention from scholars, despite the fact that Southeast Asia is a region with 
a significant maritime geostrategic role for wider Asian and global security.12  
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
Understanding this issue is crucial for the neighboring countries, in order to help 
them balance Singapore’s military modernization. International realists believe that 
international politics are anarchic and that countries pursue their natural behavior based on 
the concept of social equilibrium, which is that it is the nature of a system to find its stability 
within an environment composed of a number of autonomous forces.13 Realist countries 
believe that power balancing is the best guarantee of maintaining world security and 
peace.14 These countries balance their power appropriate to their interests based on 
knowledge about other states; as the only thing that maintains peace is the absence of 
clashed interests, this corresponds to Thucydides’ statement: “identity of interests is the 
surest of bonds whether between states or individuals.”15 However, in the case of 
Singapore, this process does not work in the usual way: despite Singapore’s success in 
modernizing its military, it does not publish many defense-policy documents in the way 
 
11 Laksmana, “Threats and Civil-Military Relations,” 1. 
12 Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan, Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and 
Consequences (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 223. 
13 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5th ed. 
(New York: Knopf; Random House, 1973), 168. 
14 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 
117. 
15 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 8. 
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that other militarily modern states do, as mentioned in Military Balance 2019;16 in any 
Singapore-related defense publications from various sources that are available for public 
viewing, the quality and depth of the elaboration are far from what other countries have 
released;17 and very few studies are available on this topic.  
Therefore, ensuring national security and addressing future threats with the proper 
knowledge and approach is crucial, otherwise it could lead Singapore’s neighbors to 
bankruptcy, isolation, and political crisis, it could even end up losing a war. Firstly, as 
resources are not unlimited, pursuing military buildup unwisely can deplete states of 
resources. Building strong military forces heavily depends on economic strength, in the 
absence of good economic management; the expense of building, operating, and 
maintaining military forces would be too high to afford, which could lead to disaster. For 
instance, there was the case of the Soviet Union, a poorly managed country that insisted on 
balancing the better managed United States18—militarily only, combined with its 
infamously inflexible communist system, to the world’s dynamics—which led to its 
collapse in 1989. Second, states seek to counter the actual threat proportionally because 
they do not want to be seen as aggressive actors, which could cost them international 
sympathy. Balancing excessively based on assumptions will almost certainly lead them 
into the Thucydides Trap, where the tension between states that increase their power are 
more likely to provoke war.19 On the other hand, balancing insufficiently leaves states 
vulnerable to future threats.  
Accordingly, this research fills the gap in knowledge about the Singapore Armed 
Forces’ modernization, providing information to satisfy the curiosity of Singapore’s 
neighbors as to what factors enabled Singapore’s success in modernizing its military. 
Understanding how Singapore carried out the modernization of its military could help 
 
16 Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia,” 303.  
17 Till and Chan. Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia, 228. 
18 Chris Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the 
USSR (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 173. 
19 Anne Kim, Richard Ned Lebow, and Daniel P. Tompkins, “The Thucydides Claptrap,” Washington 
Monthly, June 28, 2016, https://washingtonmonthly.com/thucydides-claptrap, 1. 
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regional policymakers and military leaders who want to follow Singapore’s example in 
order to balance Singapore’s military modernization, successfully, without going bankrupt 
or triggering suspicion.  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Understanding the drivers behind Singapore’s military modernization requires a 
knowledge of Singapore’s history, because Singapore’s security paradigm is traditionally 
based on a combination of both internal and external variables: its historical legacies, 
geostrategic position, and natural constraints. First, Singapore experienced traumatic ethnic 
riots around its early period of independence, 1965, which raised its fear of being 
persecuted by its two immediate neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia. Second, Singapore’s 
security perception always involved its geostrategic and geopolitical position, located 
along the confluences of vital international sea lanes of communication (SLOC) connecting 
the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea (Figure 2). The SLOC is Singapore’s main 
economic lifeline, placing the Strait of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) as the main area 
of concern of Singapore’s security paradigm. The last variable is Singapore’s natural 
constraints on its demographics, lack of territory, and natural resources. This situation 
forced Singapore, as a small island nation, to find innovative approaches to deal with its 
constraints and produce an effective defense capability amid the uncertainty of its 
continuously evolving security challenges. 
6 
 
Figure 2. Major Crude Oil Shipping Routes through Southeast Asia20 
Ancient Singapore was also known as Tumasik, which means “sea town” in old 
Javanese, before it was occupied by Thomas Stamford Raffles, a scholar and governor of 
British Bencoolen; Singapore became a British Strait Settlement in 1826, and then a 
separate British colony in 1946, governed by a civil administration and led by a governor.21 
In 1963, Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak merged, officially forming Malaysia. 
However, due to political and ethnic disagreement, on August 9, 1965, the Malaysian 
parliament voted for a constitutional amendment expelling Singapore from the federation; 
this event was crucial in shaping Singapore’s defense perspective, with Malaysia as its 
most likely adversary.22 
 
20 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “EIA 2013,” accessed on January 24 2020, 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ detail.cfm?id=10671. 
21 Robert S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Singapore: The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), 2. 
22 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 45. 
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Singapore thus experienced a humble start as a nation. Singapore was only a war-
torn port city with a small domestic market, without a hinterland and natural resources, and 
struggling with social issues such as public housing, sanitation, and unemployment. 
Furthermore, Singapore experienced traumatic ethnic violence and assertion from its 
immediate neighbors, around 1950–69, resulting in its fear of persecution. The first big 
ethnic violence between Malay and Chinese happened in 1950, known as the Maria 
Herthogh riot. It was caused by a custody rights dispute between the foster mother and 
biological parents over a thirteen-year-old Dutch girl. The second incident was the Maulid 
riot, anti-Chinese violence on a Moslem holiday, and again a spillover of violence in 1969 
from another anti-Chinese riot in Kuala Lumpur.  
As a secondary concern, there was Konfrontasi Dwikora—Confrontation 
Campaign—the aggression of Indonesia, another predominately Malay-Muslim country, 
towards the island city-state in the early 1960s, wherein Soekarno’s regime opposed the 
formation of the Federation of Malaya by the British colonials.23 Moreover, during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, it was common to portray Singapore as a “Chinese nut in a Malay 
nutcracker,” between two bigger predominantly Malay-Muslim countries following the 
post-Confrontation period.24  
These concerns have heavily influenced the Singaporean security perspective ever 
since. Due to Singapore’s traumatic experience with ethnic violence, Singapore’s leaders’ 
initial appraisal found that the Chinese ethnic dominated island city-state has ethnic 
violence as its primary internal concern, and Malaysia and Indonesia as its external 
concerns.25 Overall, Singapore’s security paradigm seems to reflect the international 
political realists’ characteristics: self-interest, survival-seeking, believing in anarchic 
international politics, always afraid, power as solution, embracing competition, preparing 
for conflict, distrusting others (including allies), indifference to justice/morality, 
 
23 Malcolm H. Murfett, Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from First Settlement 
to Final British Withdrawal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 313. 
24 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 51. 
25 “Kishore Mahbubani: Freedom of the Press in Singapore,” April 3, 2012, Big Think, 2:33 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8sykIHdvoI. 
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pragmatic.26 All of these properties shaped Singapore’s security perspective, i.e., these 
properties are reflected in the formation and transformation of the SAF. 
C. SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES’ FORMATION AND 
TRANSFORMATION 
During the 1950s–1960s, the British provided financial and practical defense 
assistance to its remaining territories in the far east: Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak, 
Brunei, and Hong Kong, through the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA).27 
Due to Singapore’s status as a British ex-colony, its defense heavily depended on the 
British Empire until the last stationed British soldier left Singapore.28 As described by Tim 
Huxley, during this time “Singapore was hardly defenseless against external threats, given 
not only the close defense relationship with Malaysia but also the massive British military 
presence,”29 which performed very well during Soekarno’s unsuccessful Confrontation 
Campaign against the Federation of Malaysia, which Singapore was part of, in 1962–66.  
However, Singapore’s role as a state in this federation was short-lived, as Singapore 
was expelled on August 9, 1965, initiated by Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman.30 In this period, everything changed drastically, including the future of 
Singapore’s defense. Singapore felt that the British forces would be unwilling or unable to 
intervene if a conflict between Singapore and Malaysia occurred. This thought was based 
on the fact that the British could not prevent nor provide a political solution during the 
expulsion of Singapore.31 Even Lee Kuan Yew himself called the idea of an independent 
and separate Singapore “a political, economic and geographical absurdity.”32 
 
26 Emily Meierding, “International Relation-Clasical Realism” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, July 15, 2019). 
27 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 2–3. 
28 Murfett, Between Two Oceans, 327. 
29 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 8. 
30 Murfett, Between Two Oceans, 315. 
31 Murfett, 316. 
32 Michael Raska, Military Innovation in Small States: Creating a Reverse Asymmetry (New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 133. 
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Concomitantly, S. Rajaratnam, Singapore’s first foreign minister, stated that an 
independent Singapore had a “near-zero chance of survival—politically, economically, or 
militarily.”33  
In this period, Singapore had almost nothing to ensure its defense, as it had no 
proper defense force at all. Singapore had only two infantry battalions, which were trained 
and equipped mainly for internal security operations, and two-thirds of these units were 
Malaysians.34 Singapore’s circumstances were worsened by the withdrawal of the British 
forces, which left Singapore with no option but to rely on itself. Even though the United 
Kingdom came with a new concept of defense arrangement in order to compensate for its 
forces’ withdrawal, Singapore felt hopeless. Only Singapore, compared to its two 
immediate neighbors, recognizes the utility of a power balancing mechanism in 
maintaining its security. Therefore, due to the involvement of its primary source of threats, 
Malaysia, in the new concept, Singapore considered even more seriously a “self-reliant” 
force posture, a force posture designed to address any regional threats independently, 
disregarding its constraints and unfavorable circumstances.  
With maintaining its independence as Singapore’s top priority, its founding father 
implied that it was important for Singapore to have an “overwhelming power”35 on its side. 
Therefore, despite the supposedly hopeless situation, led by Lee Kuan Yew’s close friend, 
Dr. Goh Keng Swee, who was also Lee’s political associate, Singapore immediately 
established a new institution called the Ministry of the Interior and Defence (MID). Goh 
Keng Swee’s team quickly looked for foreign military assistance, aiming to build a credible 
and large military force.36 Realizing that it could no longer rely on British forces, 
Singapore sought assistance from Switzerland, India, Egypt, and Israel;37 none of them 
 
33 Raska, Military Innovation in Small States, 133. 
34 Obaid Ul Haq, “Singapore’s Search for Security: A Selective Analysis” in Leadership and Security 
in Southeast Asia, Stephen Chee (ed.) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, l991) p.130. 
35 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 33. 
36 “Singapore Plans a Big Build-Up of Military Force Over 10 Years,” New York Times, December 4, 
1968, 16, ProQuest. 
37 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 11. 
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responded to Singapore’s request, except for Israel which gave a positive response and 
agreed to supply the newborn country with military mission teams, to assist Singapore form 
its own defense forces. 
Previous research concludes that the Singapore Armed Forces transformation has 
undergone three distinct phases. These phases are described in a master’s thesis by Naval 
Postgraduate School student Yong Jia Rong, using the SAF zoological analogies: 
“Poisonous Shrimp,” “Porcupine,” and “Dolphin.” The summary of this zoological 
characterization of Singapore Armed Forces evolution is presented in Table 1. 
11 
 Evolution of Singapore Armed Forces—Summary of Characteristics38 









Basic defense and 
survival: 
• Prevent successful 
invasion 
• Maintain internal 
stability 
Passive Deterrence: 
• Strong defensive 
capability  
a. Infantry-centric) 
• Fight in own territory 
• Cause substantial 








• Enhanced deterrence 
factor 
• Creation of strategic 
depth 
 
Establishment of regional 
political space: 
• Superior military 
capabilities 
Active Deterrence: 
• Strong pre-emptive 
military capability  
a. Armor and 
airstrikes 
• Fight in enemy 
territory; limited sea 
denial 
• Win the war or cause 
unacceptable damage 
to enemy 




38 Adapted from, Jia Rong Lester Yong, “Why Keep Changing? Explaining the Evolution of Singapore’s Military Strategy Since Independence” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 10, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/52956. 
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early 2000s - 
present 
Conventional military and 
non-conventional threats 
Enhanced survivability: 



















• Fight in enemy 
territory; limited sea 
control 
• Cooperation and 
confidence building 
a. Information and 
intelligence 
sharing 
b. HADR and 
OOTW 
• Prevent thought of 
harming Singapore to 
even take shape 
• Improved protection 





Though never explicitly defined by government officials, according to Yong, it is 
“possible to [synonymously] associate the three analogies with the three generations of 
evolution of the SAF.”39 Scholars and Singaporean leaders use the zoological analogies to 
portray the SAF’s acquired capabilities, intended use, and projected image and posture. 
These analogies also portray the evolution or modernization of SAF’s approaches to 
achieve its stated mission, as stated by Yong: “to enhance Singapore’s peace and security 
through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive 
victory over the aggressor.”40 
Based on Yong’s findings, in the early stage, “Poisonous Shrimp”—small and easy 
to swallow but hardly digestible—Singapore’s goal was to raise “an aggressor’s cost of 
attacking [a small] Singapore to such an undesirable level that no country would consider 
invading it.”41 In this stage the SAF was modest, passively defending the nation and 
centered primarily on deterrence of external threats and internal security; therefore, the 
Singapore Army was the top priority. In the Porcupine stage, Singapore adopted a farther 
reaching posture than “shrimp” but with “spines” that could injure the enemy—a posture 
that “at least [possesses] limited military power (the porcupine’s quills) at some distance 
from its shores.”42 In this second stage, the SAF sought to achieve enhanced survivability 
through military power projection and preemptive strike capability, defeating the enemy in 
their territory. Lastly, the Dolphin is characterized as a posture with “intelligence, speed, 
and maneuverability in a spectrum of diverse missions: from defense diplomacy and 
operations other than war to kinetic precision strike capabilities conducted further afield 
from the immediate environment of Singapore.”43 In this current stage, the SAF aimed to 
sharpen its capability uses intelligence, speed, and enhanced maneuverability in a diverse 
 
39 Yong, “Why Keep Changing? Explaining the Evolution of Singapore’s Military Strategy,” 5. 
40 Yong, 5. 
41 Yong, 6. 
42 Yong, 7. 
43 Yong, 8. 
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mission spectrum: from defense diplomacy and operations other than war to kinetic 
precision strike capabilities, carried out beyond Singapore’s immediate territory.44 
Today, according to Military Balance, 2019 edition, the Republic of Singapore Air 
Force (RSAF) is equipped with 114 modern fighter aircraft along with 19 modern attack 
helicopters, supported with AEW&C and long-range projection capabilities. The RSAF 
recently announced its plan to operate the F-35.45 The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) 
has six modern stealth frigates, four upgraded ex-Swedish submarines (with Air 
Independent Propulsion-AIP capability), along with 18 heavily armed modern combatant 
vessels in its inventory, supported by amphibious operation capability. The RSN plans to 
operate the region’s most sophisticated submarine, Type 218SG, in 2021. The Singapore 
Army has three armored brigades, nine infantry brigades, an airmobile brigade, an 
amphibious brigade and a battalion of special force. This force is supported by more than 
450 tanks (Leopard-2SG main battle tank + AMX-10/13 light tank), more than 550 infantry 
fighting vehicles (IFV), more than 1500 armored personnel carrier (APC) vehicles, and 
almost 800 artillery guns (including the sophisticated M142 HIMARS systems, and locally 
built self-propelled howitzer-SPH). 
  
 
44 Raska, Military Innovation in Small States, 146. 
45 Eng Hen Ng, “Transforming the SAF to Meet a More Troubled Environment,” Singapore Mindef, 
March 1, 2019, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-
detail/2019/March/01mar19_speech  
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 Regional Power Balance 
Year Variables Singapore Malaysia Indonesia 
197546 Defense Budget/ % GDP 
(in US$ million/%) 
366/ 5.4 619/ 4.7 1,312.5/ 3.6 
 Army 
(pers/tank/APC/artillery) 
30,000/ 75/ 530/ 60 52,500/ 0/ 400/ 80 180,000/ 325/ 220/ 176 
 Navy (Surface/Sub/Air) 28/ 0/ 0 40/ 0/ 0 50/ 3/ 35 
 Air Force 
(Fighter/others/rotary) 
57/ 56/ 20 16/ 72/ 69 16/ 112/ 55 
198547 Defense Budget/ % GDP 
(in US$ million/%) 
1,046 (1984)/ 6.31 1,976 (1984)/ 6.06 2,527 (1984)/ 3.47 
 Army (pers/tank/Armored 
Vehicle/artillery) 
45,000/ 270/ 1000/ 
60 
90,000/ 26/ 949/ 
114 
216,000/ 111/ 430/ 200 
 Navy (Surface/Sub/Air) 33/ 0/ 0 52/ 0/ 0 84/ 2/ 33 
 Air Force 
(Fighter/others/rotary) 
93/ 112/ 51 39/ 79/ 67 44/ 80/ 44 
199348 Defense Budget/ % GDP 
(in US$ million/%) 
2,130 (1991)/ 5.29 1,960 (1992)/ 3.55 1,770 (1992)/ 1.38 
 Army 
(pers/tank/APC/artillery) 
45,000/ 350/ 1,022/ 
142 
85,000/ 26/ 701/ 
199 
202,900/ 125/ 465/ 180 
 Navy (Surface/Sub/Air) 38/ 0/ 0 51/ 0/ 12 101/ 2/ 43 
 Air Force 
(Fighter/others/rotary) 
151/ 76/ 51 54/ 43/ 54 68/ 95/ 54 
200549 Defense Budget/ % GDP 
(in US$ million/%) 
4,300/ 2,300/ 1,100/ 
 Army 
(pers/tank/APC/artillery) 
50,000/ 450/ 750/ 
224 
80,000/ 26/ 1,020/ 
164 
233,000/ 335/ 356/ 185  
 Navy (Surface/Sub/Air) 33/ 3/ 5 54/ 0/ 6 107/ 2/ 69 
 Air Force 
(Fighter/others/rotary) 
125/ 79/ 93 74/ 40/ 40 75/80/ 38 
201950 Defense Budget/ % GDP 
(in US$ million/%) 
11,000 (2018)/ 3.17 3,870 (2018)/ 1.1 7,320 (2018)/ 0.72 
 Army 
(pers/tank/APC/artillery) 
50,000/ 468/ 2,148/ 
798 
80,000/ 69/ 1,082/ 
424 
300,400/ 429/ 634/ 
1,198 
 Navy (Surface/Sub/Air) 42/ 4/ 13 64/ 2/ 12 161/ 4/ 68 
 Air Force 
(Fighter/others/rotary) 
100/ 54/ 70 47/ 124/ 59 49/ 177/ 36 
 
46 Source: Ronald Huisken, Defence Resources of South East Asia and the South West Pacific: A 
Compendium of Data. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, 1980, 1–33.  
47 Source: Institute for Strategic Studies, “Asia and Australasia.” The Military Balance 1984–1985 
(London: The Garden City Press, 1985), 111–137. 
48 Source: Institute for Strategic Studies, “East Asia and Australasia.” The Military Balance 1993–
1994 (London: Brassey’s Ltd, 1993), 146–172. 
49 Source: Institute for Strategic Studies, “East Asia and Australasia.” The Military Balance 2004–
2005 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), 161–193. 
50 Source: Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia.” The Military Balance 119:1, 222–319. 
16 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on a common idea in managerial literature that good management is the key 
to success and strategic planning is a roadmap to organizational success—e.g., General 
Electric’s success story as the beacon of strategic planning and the popularity of the 
strength, weakness, opportunity, and threat (SWOT) analysis among regional military 
leaders—the most plausible explanation for why Singapore has succeeded at modernizing 
its military where other states in the region have not is that the SAF properly formulated 
its strategic planning. This possibility is indicated by the fact that most of the chiefs of 
services in SAF once held the posts of Head of Joint Plans and Transformation Department 
of their respective services or general staff.  
On the other hand, another possible explanation is innovation institutionalization, 
a more flexible alternative compared to strategic planning. As characterized by Michael 
Raska, Singapore has been highly innovative and adaptive in dealing with international and 
regional political and economic dynamics, evidenced by the three main shifts in the 
evolution of the SAF. Singapore’s success story, therefore, could have been enabled by its 
capability for being highly adaptive and innovative in dealing with international and 
regional politics and economic dynamics during each shift. As Scott D. Anthony et al., 
point out, innovation institutionalization is “an effort to build an engine that produces a 
steady stream of innovative growth,”51 in order to gain superiority over competitors. Thus, 
this approach of institutionalizing innovation could have enabled Singapore to differentiate 
itself from its regional competitors and gain significant superiorities in the defense realm. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Drawing from the two most widely used approaches in achieving organizational 
success—strategic planning and innovation institutionalization—this research examines 
how Singapore successfully modernized its armed forces. This research will utilize 
historical analysis, comparative studies, and case studies as the primary methods in 
examining the relationship between Singapore’s military modernization conceptualization 
 
51 Scott D. Anthony, Mark W. Johnson, and Joseph V. Sinfield. “Institutionalizing Innovation.” MIT 
Sloan Management Review; Cambridge 49, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 45. 
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and implementation in every transformation phase with contemporary military 
modernization efforts in the neighboring countries. Overall, this research discusses the 
approaches Singapore took and how it managed to modernize its military, and what made 
Singapore’s approaches so successful while neighboring countries did not succeed. 
Data and information will be taken from Singapore’s various defense-related 
publications from the 1950s to the present. Official speeches, defense data, and other 
related documents from other credible parties are part of the comparative studies in this 
research. Additionally, analytical studies on collected data, related to regional issues, from 
credible regional and international media sources provide additional information. 
Literature on management, defense planning, strategic planning, innovation 
institutionalization, policy history, military strategic thinking, military innovation, and 
other related publications support the primary resources of study. Historical analysis is also 
part of the research process, to provide a better understanding of the relationships between 
variables.  
F. CRITIQUE 
How can strategic planning and innovation institutionalization, which many 
publications categorize as part of business and management strategies literature, apply to a 
military organization, which does not pursue profit, like a commercial company does?  
Although, the idea of private companies’ profit-seeking orientation does not seem 
fit in the defense realm, actually it does. As Charles J. Hitch, and Roland N. McKean argue, 
in the defense realm, there are many similarities to private company such as an objective, 
budgetary and other resource constraints, and also a challenge to economize.52 Moreover, 
strategy and cost are interdependent: as he characterized, it is like the front and the rear 
sights of a rifle.53 This characterization means that it is impossible to get a good result by 
adjusting one of the rifle’s sights only. Therefore, the idea of strategic planning and 
innovation institutionalization are applied to the defense realm. 
 
52 Charles J. Hitch, and Roland N. McKean. The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 2. 
53 Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, 3. 
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G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The goal of this thesis is to explain what enabled Singapore’s remarkable 
achievement in modernizing its armed forces. In line with that goal, this thesis is organized 
into five chapters. Chapter II provides the historical background and theory of strategic 
planning and innovation institutionalization; and an explanation of what factors possibly 
enabled Singapore Armed Forces’ modernization. Chapter III explains critiques or pitfalls 
of planning and strategic planning. Chapter IV explains the significance of the Singapore 
Armed Forces’ innovation institutionalization in enabling its modernization. Finally, 
Chapter V provides summary, conclusion, and possible future research related to the 










II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
There are only a few studies which attempt to explain the Singapore Armed Forces 
modernization. Therefore, this research draws upon literature in a number of fields, 
including various support resources, official publications and documents, books, speeches, 
articles, journals, and other materials to provide knowledge about how a defense 
organization conducts its operations. First, the literature review examines the theoretical 
explanation of defense planning. Second, we examine literature on strategic planning, 
including its advantages and disadvantages. Finally, the last section discusses literature on 
innovation institutionalization, which provides another set of systematic tools with which 
to assess Singapore’s military modernization. 
A. THEORY OF DEFENSE PLANNING AS RISK MANAGEMENT 
Many variables must be considered regarding how an organization balances 
between preparing to face its future challenges and maintaining daily operations, as must 
a country in overcoming its strategic risks in balancing foreign policy and maintaining 
national security. This situation arises because of the nature of countries, which always 
assess their relations with other countries, enemies, allies, and even neighboring countries. 
Therefore, as an organization, will countries begin to identify how their perspectives are in 
handling certain problems or even future disputes? What circumstances can bring them 
into conflict, in the end, and how do they protect their interests? When a country starts to 
find out what military capability is needed and how to get it, that is when management 
methods are needed: defense planning. 
As Frederic Taylor argues, planning is one of the best organizational scientific 
approaches to management.54 He also proposes that productivity will increase if the 
manager optimizes and simplifies the working process. Therefore, he presented four basic 
reasons for why an organization should conduct planning. First, organizations should plan 
to coordinate activities. Second, organizations need to ensure that the future is taken into 
 
54 Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, 
Plans, Planners (New York: Free Press, 1994), 16. 
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account. Third, organizations should be rational in conducting their businesses. Last, a plan 
is required to control organization operations. 
Planning should be performed in every step that an organization will take. A good 
plan should cover the required activities to achieve the desired goals. Planning should 
include the worst scenario to prevent any losses in the future. Hence, many organizations 
have more than one plan for every goal. Any possible future regarding the internal and 
external factors of the organizations’ growth such as the employees and the consumers 
should be accounted for to calculate whether the organization’s performance can meet their 
demands. All in all, planning is conducted to control how well the organization is being 
run. The better a plan is developed, the better the organization can perform.  
In terms of defense planning, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) employs a 
planning process since it designs how big the structure and posture of its military forces 
must be as well as setting the readiness level.55 Therefore, a rational mechanism is used 
by generating the defense requirements, which is divided into two basic methodologies of 
planning: demand- and supply-based planning. Prior planning tends to be demand-based, 
in which the strategies, capabilities and capacities needed to be set are based on the ideas 
of the need for the potential future engagement. Hence, demand-based planning considers 
the possible threats or the desired capabilities, even the combination of the two. This 
planning relates to the high-level of strategy to forecast the requirements needed in the 
future in line with the objectives that need to be accomplished,56 which is called top-down 
planning.  
In contrast, supply-based planning engages with a particular real-world constraint 
including the current size of the force, the mix of capabilities and budget limits, as well as 
the availability of forces built from the baseline. This planning is called bottom-up planning 
 
55 Michael J. Mazarr, Katharina Ley Best, Burgess Laird, Eric V. Larson, Michael E. Linick, Dan 
Madden, The U.S. Department of Defense’s Planning Process: Components and Challenges, (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2019), ix. 
56 Mazarr, Best, Lairs, Larson, Linick, and  Madden, The U.S. Department of Defense’s Planning 
Process,” x.  
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which starts from the existing lower level, capabilities and resources, and builds up to the 
current force.57  
When there is a gap between demand- and supply-based planning, there will be 
potential risk arising such as the effect of a resource-driven force, which is less capable in 
some ways than what would be prescribed by the top-down approach. Thus, the planning 
will not achieve its success unless it has the appropriate capabilities, capacity, and risk.58 
Therefore, a good strategic risk assessment should be conducted to deal with any possible 
liabilities in the future. 
As Stephan Fruhling states, “once strategic risk is assessed, it must be related to the 
basic questions of defense planning outlines: its likelihood, consequences, material and 
political aspects, and associated uncertainties must be evaluated and managed.”59 He also 
outlines four defense planning frameworks that discuss various kinds of strategic risks: 
1. Net assessment-based planning to meet the risk of conflict in the present 
and near future, with one known and understood adversary; 
2. Mobilization planning to meet the risk of conflict in the future, at an 
uncertain time and from a threat that is yet to develop; 
3. Portfolio planning, where the defence force must be able to configure 
itself to meet several different risks, and concurrency judgements are of 
central importance; and 
4. Task-based planning, where uncertainty about the circumstances in 
which the defence force might be used is so great that planning has to 
focus on the ability to conduct basic military tasks.60 
The application of a defense planning framework must be based on predictions, 
current assessments, and assessments of future challenges from a political perspective, 
followed by setting priorities. Similarly, analytical, planning, and programming efforts 
should be done during the development of the planning in order to determine the force 
posture required by a particular country. Most developed countries, which are serious about 
 
57 Mazarr, Best, Lairs, Larson, Linick & Madden, x. 
58 Mazarr, Best, Lairs, Larson, Linick & Madden, xi. 
59 Stephan Frühling, Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the Next Asia-Pacific War 
(London; Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 3. 
60 Frühling, Defence Planning and Uncertainty, 3. 
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implementing foreign policy, draw up a documented defense planning framework, together 
with assessments and future challenges they expect to manage. This document also 
includes general and detailed national defense reviews, which also include a summary of 
the framework that guides defense planning decisions; this document is better known as a 
defense white paper. Since modern militarized countries, mostly Western, publish this 
document regularly, many countries follow their path.61 
The framework is applicable to various types of defense organizations in many 
countries. However, there are other approaches regarding defense planning since there is a 
need for improving planning not only based on the prediction and possible future 
challenges but also the requirement for an efficient process from more complex 
organizations. Therefore, as shown in Table 3, Henry C. Bartlett et al., identify nine 
different alternative defense planning approaches: Top-Down, Bottom-Up, Scenario, 
Threats and Vulnerabilities, Core Competencies and Missions, Capability-Based, 







61 Frederick W. Taylor, Scientific Management, (Harper & Row, 1947), 4. 
62 Henry C. Bartlett, Paul G. Holman Jr, and Timothy E. Somes, “The Art of Strategy and Force 
Planning,” In Strategy and Force Planning, ed. by Security, Strategy, and Forces, Faculty (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 2004), 17–33. 
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 Summary of Alternative Approaches to Defense Planning63 




Systematic focus on 
ends 
Integrates tools of power 








Practical current focus 
Emphasizes real world 
Improves existing forces 
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Focus on potential 
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Functions Prioritizes core 
capabilities 
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Exploits weaknesses of 
others 
May retain outdated 
capabilities 
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Focus on operational 
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63 Bartlett et al., “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning, 31.  
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Approaches “Drivers” Strengths Pitfalls 
Confronts uncertain 
future 











Risk high cost for a small 
gain 
May undervalue human 
factors 
May unbalance force 
structure 
Fiscal Budget Defense linked to the 
economy 
Requires priority setting 
Fosters fiscal discipline 
May lead to underfunded 
needs 
Tends to create cyclic 
spending 
Leads to “fair sharing” 
 
Bartlett et al., define planning based on the strengths and possible pitfalls or 
drawbacks of each approach. The first alternative, “top-down,” suggests that planning is 
driven by the interest, objective, and strategies that exist in an organization. It also proposed 
that the approach’s strength pertains to the goal or objective of the organization; thus, 
planning focuses on the aim that the organization wants to achieve. It also utilizes any tools 
of power owned by the organization; therefore, the more the approach is described, the 
more systematic the goal achievement efforts will be. However, this approach also provides 
drawbacks such as facing future constraints, inflexibility and lack of detail, for it can be 
too focused on achieving the goals while overlooking any little details that may constrain 
its path in the future.  
The second approach, “bottom-up,” uses existing capability to its limit to achieve 
its goal. This approach will plan the defense by using current capability as the foundation. 
It takes every single detail into account. Therefore, it emphasizes the real world and 
improves the existing force. However, even though it is well planned, it still lacks future 
prediction, so it is likely to neglect long-term creativity since it focuses on current issues 
as well as neglecting the integrated global view.  
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The third approach is “scenario” based. Here, the approach considers a specific 
situation as the basic establishment of planning. Therefore, the strength of this approach is 
that it has tangible focus because the planning will calculate the steps to be taken in 
reaching the goal as well as the possible issues that will be faced in the future. 
Unfortunately, this approach also allows risks to arise, such as the possibility that there will 
be an unpredictable world. Since this approach only focuses on their scenario, it may be 
vulnerable to other intervening factors to be neglected. Similarly, it also limits the future 
insight and may take on “a life of its own.” 
The fourth approach is “threats and vulnerabilities.” This approach uses any 
possible risks, adversaries, and the organization’s weak points for defense planning. This 
approach’s strength lays in the focus on potential adversaries, broad and specific aims, and 
the force’s capabilities. This approach focuses on any possible risk factors both internal 
and external. However, it still has pitfalls, such as the identification process which may 
take too much time because it needs to be discussed thoroughly. It is also reactive and 
biased toward quantitative data. 
Therefore, Bartlett et al., propose the fifth approach, based on “core competencies 
and mission” which is driven by the desired planning future functions. It brings benefits 
such as the ability to prioritize core capabilities so that the organization can utilize its 
capabilities as efficiently as possible to reach their goal. Besides, this approach also 
maximizes strengths and exploit others’ weaknesses. In other words, this approach 
leverages the force’s capabilities to defend against the others’ threats. However, 
practically, this approach usually retains outdated capabilities since the organization is 
already satisfied with its current power and then it may cause the organization to ignore 
the higher goals since it is in their safe zone. These will lead the organization toward sub-
optimization.  
The sixth approach is “capability-based,” which is driven by operational 
challenges. This approach specifically focuses on the military problem and concept of 
operational and the force’s joint capabilities; hence, this approach emphasizes joint 
capabilities. However, this approach fails to determine the level of required forces for it 
neglects the possibility of future challenges.  
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In contrast, the seventh approach, “hedging,” appears as its solution; its driver is 
risk minimization. The hedging approach benefits from the spectrum of the force’s 
capability and utilizes it for its best application. This approach also may confront an 
uncertain future preventing the organization from being overwhelmed by any potential 
solutions when an unpredicted attack comes. Furthermore, it seeks balance and flexibility 
so that the organization can take any steps required when facing the future incident. Even 
though this approach is needed, it still has risks, such as that it may understate its own 
strengths, exaggerate other’s capabilities, and can be very costly. The risks appear when 
the plan has too much prediction and preparation so that the cost is getting higher, as there 
is no perfect forecasting.  
The last two approaches are “technology” and “fiscal.” The former emphasizes the 
knowledge mastered by the forces and engages creativity to develop military leverage. The 
pitfalls of this approach come from risking high cost only to gain a small amount of 
achievement since there is no cheap technology in this century. Then, it may undervalue 
human factors, since technology is preferable, because it is considered easier to control 
than human. This undervaluing action may imbalance the force’s structure. Next, the last 
approach that needs to be considered is fiscal. This approach helps bridge the economists 
and the military forces, since the military organization does not operate in the same way as 
the private company, which seeks profit. Thus, the planning of defense will be connected 
to the budget planning.  
The ten alternative approaches to defense planning by Bartlett et al., provides 
various approaches in defense planning complete with the strengths and weaknesses of 
each approach. Therefore, this research discusses the application of these principles during 
the process of Singapore military modernization, by providing the background of the 
current force situation and categorizing Singapore’s approach based on the alternative 
defense planning approaches.  
B. THEORY OF STRATEGIC PLANNING 
Understanding the source or nature of Singapore’s successful military 
modernization requires a framework for evaluating Singapore’s military modernization 
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and the literature on strategic planning provides such a framework. Therefore, an 
understanding of the definition of strategic planning is crucial added up with the 
understanding of its virtues as well as pitfalls and fallacies. 
In The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Henry Mintzberg concludes that 
planning is future thinking, an effort to control the future; planning also involves the 
process of decision-making, or even synchronizing the minds of the nowadays-decision-
makers, and finally, as Mintzberg argues, it is also “a formalized procedure to produce an 
articulated result in the form of an integrated system of decisions.”64 With respect to the 
strategic part of strategic planning, he also argues that strategy is a plan and a pattern. 
Strategy as a plan means that it is something equivalent to a direction, guide, or a course 
of action to get from one point to the desired point; some planners call it an end goal. 
Strategy as a pattern is reflected in behavioral consistency over time while taking future 
dynamics into account. Again, according to Mintzberg, together, strategic planning is the 
process of strategy formation; it involves the “planning process, designed or supported by 
planners, plans to produce plans.”65 Overall, Mintzberg concluded that all these terms can 
work together or be independent of each other.  
How does this process of strategic planning take place? Mintzberg states that there 
is a formalization of the process of strategy formation, called the SWOT model, which 
stands for strengths, and weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.66 The SWOT model 
process involves an initial appraisal, both internally and externally, which assesses many 
variables: the creation of the strategy or planning the strategy, where planners may come 
with different approaches; formalization of the strategy; evaluation of the best one; and 
finally, the process of strategy implementation. Mintzberg summarizes this process through 
a model called the “Design School” model of strategy formation, based on the premise that 
strategy formulation is a conceptual process of designing strategies (Figure 3). Mintzberg 
 
64 Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, 14. 
65 Mintzberg, 32. 
66 Pmp Pritchard, “SWOT Analysis.” In Risk Management: Concepts and Guidance, Fifth Edition, 
183–90 (Auerbach Publications, 2015), 151. https://doi.org/10.1201/9780429438967-24. 
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also emphasizes that some other scholars did not even call “Design School” a model due 
to the vast dynamics in the real world.  
 
Figure 3. Core “Design School” Model of Strategy Formation67 
Planning literature demonstrates that a well-designed system or method more 
consistently increases the chance of organizational success compared to human factors, 
such as intuition and commitment,68 as planners believe that human factors are unreliable, 
whereas systematic methods and strategic planning are more reliable.69 Deepak Kukreja 
points out that it is better to be approximately right, helped by the systematic method, than 
 
67 Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, 37. 
68 Mintzberg, 222. 
69 Mintzberg, 223. 
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to be precisely wrong,70 referring to how, theoretically, a systematic method could provide 
a clear direction, as well as efficient and effective measures towards success, compared to 
pursuing unclear goals relying on human intuition and commitment. Lastly, Michael Porter 
also emphasizes the importance of strategic planning: “As firms [organizations] grew and 
became more complex…they needed a systematic approach to setting strategy. Strategic 
planning emerged as the answer.”71 Therefore, strategic planning could have increased the 
capability of the Republic of Singapore, a complex organization, to operate more 
efficiently toward achieving its predefined goal, a modern SAF.  
However, Mintzberg also argues against the conventional wisdom which favors 
strategic planning.72 He argues that there are several crucial pitfalls and fallacies in 
planning and strategic planning implementation. As he points out, there are four pitfalls to 
the planning practices. First, the top management’s participation in and support of planning 
will not ensure the achievement of the desired end goal. Second, all types of plans are 
vulnerable to any changes and dynamics in their implementation. In fact, the more 
advanced and established a plan, the more inflexible the administration becomes; the more 
detailed and institutionally widespread the plan, the greater the inflexibility.73 Third, 
political activity may interfere with the planning process, an exercise of interest 
competition. Fourth, the plan tends to control everyone and everything, due to a flaw in the 
planning process, that all components should manifest it collectively, not individually.74  
Likewise, according to Mintzberg, the fallacies of strategic planning are: First, the 
assumption that discontinuities can be predicated. Second, planners are separated from the 
reality of every organization. The third is the assumption that strategy making can be 
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formalized.75 Another scholar, Aaron Wildasvsky, claims in his planning criticism that in 
its effort to regulate everything, planning could end up regulating nothing: 
• Planning protrudes in so many directions, the planner can no longer 
discern its shape. He may be the economist, political scientist, 
sociologist, architect or [even] scientist. Yet the essence of his 
calling-planning-escapes him. He finds it everywhere in general and 
nowhere in particular. Why is planning so elusive?76 
Moreover, there is also a concern of the contractual nature of strategic planning.77 
Allaire and Firsirotu proposed that the contractual nature of strategic planning provides 
some functional modes of planning in which each mode needs particular requirements to 
be successful.  
The strategic plan, as a contract, defines all the potential pitfalls of the principal-
agent relationship.78 Therefore, a system should be managed to prevent the pitfalls so that 
the organization can monitor and reward the agents to maximize the benefits. The system 
should be able to measure the issues within the organization; thus, Allaire and Firsirotu 
claim that there are two sets of measures—structural and cultural—to deal with the possible 
risks and problems in the organization.  
The structural approach is heavily influenced by economic theory and claims that 
both the principal and the agents have self-interest in maximizing their economic benefits, 
which also tends to minimize costs. In the end, this system will entail the adoption of an 
appropriate organizational form and an effective control/inducement apparatus to protect 
the organization from opportunistic behavior. Therefore, the solution is to divide the 
organization into units of a moderate and manageable size, as well as having a clear market 
purpose. The other step is to assign both responsibility and accountability of each unit to 
competent managers who operate with an external control system (including a highly 
competitive product markets and an efficient financial market, as well as a tight 
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organization monitoring) and reward (including the complex structure of salaries based on 
the employee’s capabilities and function, bonus, stock options etc.).79  
In contrast, the cultural solution toward the corporate’s issues proposes that the 
shared values, goals and experience have a significant effect in reducing the cost of self-
serving behavior. It points out that the organization should have a set of core skills to invest 
at, in order to familiarize the members toward a common set of values, benefits and 
management principles. This is also useful for defining a long-term relationship between 
the individual and the organization. Regarding this solution, a limitation of the diversity of 
business should be taken into account in every firm since it depends upon the same set of 
critical skills. In other words, when the corporation produces too much variety of product, 
technology and success factors will make it impossible to establish a cohesive and 
encompassing culture for the entire organization, for they lack the principal identity.80  
However, to deal with the possible risks and problems in the organization, neither 
the structural nor cultural solution is cost-free. Besides, the degree of emphasize on each 
solution is often a matter of choice regarding the issues that occur in the firm or 
organization. However, once made, these choices—whether to utilize the structural or 
cultural, or even the combination of the two—are very hard to reverse.81  
These critiques, with regard to the pitfalls and fallacies of strategic planning, raise 
significant questions about how Singapore overcame these issues and still managed to 
achieve its desired end goal, or even whether it used strategic planning at all. 
This subchapter has provided theoretical explanations of what is strategic planning, 
what are its superiorities as well as its flaws and fallacies. During the implementation of 
strategic planning, every organization or administration has to deal with a wide array of 
variables during the preliminary appraisal, end goal prioritization, strategy formulation, 
and implementation. Although strategic planning helps an organization understand its 
position and future direction, the only certainty of future challenges is the uncertainty. 
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Therefore, organizations have to deal with strategic planning’s flaws and fallacies, too, 
such as top management involvement not being a guarantee of success, vulnerability 
toward changes, political interference, and its inflexibility. 
C. INNOVATION INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Analyzing Singapore’s military modernization from an alternative perspective—
innovation institutionalization—requires an understanding of the characteristics of this 
method. As stated by Scott D. Anthony et al., innovation institutionalization is an effort to 
build “an engine that produces a steady stream of innovative growth.”82 They also argue 
that “companies that create blueprints for growth, construct innovation engines and support 
the engines with the right systems and mind-sets can establish favorable conditions for 
substantial innovation.”83 The capability of an organization to build and maintain 
innovation institutionalization could significantly differentiate the organization from its 
competitors.  
These scholars argue that for an organization to create a growth blueprint, a guide 
and direction that articulates the desired outcomes, and to decide which strategies are 
good—or bad—the organization will have to deal with uncertain and endless innovation 
competition. It also identifies and explains the desired results or goals of the organization’s 
innovation efforts and where growth and development must be expected. In general, 
growth and expansion come from organizational efforts that enhance the core business, 
move to adjacent markets, or go to uncharted seas by creating totally new businesses. More 
important, commonly easy-to-understand insights, generated from the blueprint, help 
clarify the picture of the challenges of innovation and make it easier for managers to 
understand the characteristics of different approaches, which lead to the whole organization 
efficiently and effectively deciding which strategies or approaches should be taken to 
achieve the objectives. Because resources are limited, organizations, ideally, must allocate 
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their possessed resources toward the different types of effort or innovation, appropriately. 
Otherwise, they will only bankrupt themselves.  
The next step is to construct an innovation engine. As it is hard for new growth 
initiatives to succeed without structural support and there is no one-size-fits-all way to 
structure for innovation,84 Anthony et al., argue that there are four different structures to 
consider, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Structure of Innovation.85 
Based on the structure of innovation proposed by Anthony et al., the first structure 
is training the units within the organization. This structure aims to stimulate the innovation. 
As the foundation of the structure, training requires the organization to build disruption-
specific skills and culture focusing on building the skills and changing the mindset of core 
personnel in order to fuel internal innovation. The effort of developing a new mindset will 
help the organization in solving its practical innovation problems because it allows the 
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personnel or even the boards to gain exposure to important external developments. 
Therefore, training can be gained from outside the organization by conducting a joint 
venture with influential companies to maximize the potential benefits between the 
organizations.  
The second structure is funding or oversight mechanisms. This structure allows the 
company to shepherd or safeguard the innovation generated. The core problem of a firm 
can be the source of funding. Hence, generous funding may help the internal innovators 
who are immediately faced with a “stuck” because the lack of funding can be solved and 
then their innovative ideas are secured. This structure benefits the creative innovators to 
grow their ideas so that their ideas will not encounter limits, or cause worry or even anxiety 
about possible unsuccessful ideas in the future.  
The third structure is incubators. This structure attempts to accelerate ideas when 
the funds gathered are still insufficient to generate ideas. A firm whose incubators are 
dedicated will gain many benefits for their ability to alter rough ideas into something 
bigger, better, cheaper and faster, in the blink of an eye. However, the organization may 
have to follow a process outside its constraints and priorities to allow the incubators to 
execute their ideas because they commonly work outside of the box.  
The last structure is the autonomous growth group. This will expand the 
organization since it allows it to launch new and different kinds of businesses. These 
autonomous groups will help the company in developing non-core business concepts as 
well as exploring various concepts outside the core’s comfort zone. Having fully dedicated 
innovation generalists and other high-potential leaders will help them allocate a modest 
budget to quickly iterate solutions toward organizational success. 
The effort to achieve goals will not endure unless organizations create a supportive 
climate or environment for the innovation to thrive. Therefore, an effort to maintain and 
support the innovation engine is crucial. Successful organizations must also have a 
managerial level that is actively involved in developing ideas and sharing the same 
language of innovation, which this engine is facilitating, as Anthony et al., argue, using 
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“substantial external input, and creating policies and incentives that encourage people to 
take managed risks on the path to innovative growth.”86 
Concomitantly, Michael Raynor and Clayton Christensen also characterize that 
instituting innovation is not an easy job. Some sizeable and complex organizations may 
also be utilizing the internal-customer concept, where internal departments serve as service 
provider to other departments in the same organization.87 The service provider department 
tries to provide its best service by listening to its internal customers and dealing with, as 
characterized by Raynor and Christensen, a “painful choice between serving today’s best 
internal customers and creating future best internal customers.”88 This situation would 
make the organization vulnerable to disruption, which inhibits its growth, called the 
“innovator’s dilemma.”89 This phenomenon could be a serious issue during the 
implementation of innovation in large and complex organizations.90  
Therefore, Alex Osterwalder invented a method to simplify the picturization of 
innovation efforts in describing, finding challenges, designing, and inventing suitable 
business model or models, known as the Osterwalder’s Business Model Canvas. This chart 
could show the flexibility and method for simplifying innovation implementation, as 
shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. The Osterwalder Business Canvas91 
The canvas is a kind of chart to describe, challenge, design, and invent any type of 
business model, even modify the existing model, systematically to serve the organization 
or corporation’s goals and make them tangible. This business canvas consists of nine 
building blocks: customer segments, value propositions, channels, customer relations, 
revenue streams, key resources, key activities, key partners, and cost structure.92 The first 
block, customer segments block, is a block that defines what kind of customer an 
organization is trying to serve. The second block, the value proposition, describes the value 
of the organization’s products and services that serve the customers’ needs or interests. The 
third block, the channel block, should tell the potential means of how customers reach the 
organization, and vice versa. The fourth block, customer relationships, provides a slot to 
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customize specific relationships to particular customers or segments; this block aims to 
maintain customer loyalty. The fifth block, revenue stream, describes the methods of how 
the customer contributes to the organization or company through various methods of 
payments or other means that benefit the organization. The sixth block, key resources, lists 
the significant resources the organization requires to produce value, which varies from raw 
material resources, factories, brands, or intellectual properties. The seventh block, key 
activity, covers what kind of crucial activities serve the organization’s goals best, what the 
organization really needs to do to excel. The eighth block, key partners, list the important 
and potential partners that an organization should work with to achieve its goals or leverage 
its business. Lastly, after properly filling the first eight blocks, an organization should 
be able to determine its cost structure. Most simply, other than providing a clear picture 
and better understanding of a business concept, this chart could also provide flexibility 
through something even as simple as the sticky note. It means that the innovator could 
simply map out the concept by replacing the idea, written on a sticky note, with a new one, 
without breaking the whole concept, when the idea no longer accommodates the 
organization’s goals. 
Creating the ability to produce a sustainable stream of innovative growth does not 
happen overnight. Organizations that have decided to institutionalize innovation as their 
approach must start by orienting their current position through auditing their innovation 
capabilities and developing plans to compensate for their identified weaknesses. In the next 
step, they must change the organizational culture and build new structures and systems that 
support innovation to thrive, which are not easy and become more complicated as the size 
of the organization grows. However, organizations which develop a shared perspective of 
their main goals, start to act, and are capable of making the necessary adjustments when 
they decide to prioritize what sector has the opportunity to succeed and what does not, are 
organizations with a better chance of succeeding. 
This literature review has provided theoretical explanations of where the position 
of defense planning fits in risk management and how strategic planning differs from 
innovation institutionalization. Defense planning is a method of a military organization in 
managing its routine operations. Strategic planning is a method of strategic formation in 
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dealing with future challenges, which produces guidelines—what and how to do—based 
on a predicted, predefined, and prejudged future challenge, which mostly tends to behave 
like a contract, binding and inflexible, due to the tendency of strategic planning users to 
formalize their plans. On the other hand, innovation institutionalization produces an engine 
that nurtures innovation in order to deal with future challenges, prepared to deal with the 
uncertainty of future challenges. 
Overall, both strategic planning and innovation institutionalization are strategy 
formulation methods. The main distinction between the two methods are: strategic 
planning always predefining its future challenges and less flexibly due to its tendency to 
be formalized, while innovation institutionalization has nothing defining its future 
challenges, therefore, it becomes so flexible in addressing any challenges. 
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III. THE SAF MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROCESS 
This chapter analyzes what approaches made Singapore’s military modernization 
so successful. The analysis is organized according to the SAF evolutionary stages. The 
initial period (mid 1960s–1970s) heavily focused on recruiting and establishing the 
Singapore security and defense forces, assisted by Israel Defense Forces advisers. As 
characterized by Evan Laksmana, 1G SAF (1970s–1980s), “Poisonous Shrimp,” 
concentrated on developing and building the capabilities of each service, while 
implementing then-visionary yet now conservative approaches. The 2G SAF (1980s–
1990s), “Porcupine,” was a period of consolidation and adaptation; during this period the 
SAF moved from strategic thinking on each service to a conventional combination of 
armed warfare, driven by the maturity of the SAF capabilities and domestic defense 
planning capacity. The 3G SAF (2000s–2030s), “Dolphin,” aimed at applying the 
transition to a joint strategy to create a force posture with multi-mission capabilities,93 and 
the 4G SAF (2030s onward)94 is a well-debated and -researched concept of future SAF, 
based on cutting-edge technology as a force multiplier. 
The analysis finds that Singapore Armed Forces’ modernization not only involved 
replacing its hardware but also, more significantly, modernizing its software—conceptual, 
organizational, technological, and operational95—during all its evolution stages. During 
the early stages, Singapore implemented predefined situation-based development—
strategic planning—assisted by Israeli military advisers and by their guidance documents, 
the “brown book” and the “blue book.”96 In the next stage, thanks to its heavy investment 
in training and education,97 Singapore started to cultivate innovation through its military 
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personnel, academically, through monographs and journals,98 which increased its 
modernization pace; backed by a nurturing culture of innovative ideas alongside SAF’s 
regular, well-functioning bureaucracy. In the current stage, its modernization pace is barely 
challenged regionally, propelled by the remarkable thriving of innovation within the SAF, 
due to its establishment of dedicated organizations that act as innovation engines. Based 
on these findings, the early period of Singapore’s military development showed a 
distinctive pattern that differentiated it from the rest. Ultimately the less flexible strategic 
planning method did help SAF modernization during its early period, then the flexible 
innovation institutionalization method started to take over gradually in the 1980s. In the 
3G SAF, Singapore maintained its technological advancement thanks to innovation 
institutionalization. The combination of thriving innovation and Singapore’s well-
functioning bureaucracy refined through early-stage strategic planning kept SAF 
innovation productive rather than disruptive and inefficient. 
A. SAF INITIAL PHASE (MID-1960s–1970s)  
Although the term “strategic planning” was not yet widespread, Singapore was 
already employing the concept by identifying strengths and weaknesses, forecasting future 
goals and threats, and defining suitable approaches and guidelines. Using SWOT analysis, 
Singapore not only properly identified its strengths and weaknesses but also took its best 
opportunity in addressing its well-defined threats. First, Singapore had security benefits 
from the presence of British Forces, which it identified as its strength. Second, Singapore 
fairly and openly acknowledged its weaknesses: its deficiency of military experience and 
its natural constraints. Third, it addressed its deficiency by looking for opportunities, asking 
for foreign assistance to help build up its military forces. Last, Singapore defined how 
much military buildup was enough, by designing its military capability to maintain internal 
security and to defend its territory against its traditional threats, its immediate neighbors: 
Malaysia and Indonesia. 
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1. Threats 
As described in Chapter I, Singapore’s security perspective is heavily shaped by its 
geopolitical concern regarding its immediate neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, which 
significantly affects Singapore’s internal stability. Therefore, Singapore identified its 
threats based on this context and formalized its threat assumptions as the main reason to 
develop its military posture.  
Even though Singapore gained independence in 1965, and despite Singapore’s 
constitutional secession from Malaysia, Malaysia maintained a security interest in the 
island. Malaysia did not hesitate to practice coercive diplomacy when it deemed 
Singapore’s actions as unacceptable, and even insisted on stationing an infantry regiment 
in Singapore following its independence, in a demonstration of force.99 This action 
compelled Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to allow Malaysian Army outriders 
to “escort” him to the first post-independence Parliament sitting. This threat was even 
tightened when Malaysia wanted to use its Navy to blockade an offshore island that would 
be used by Singapore as a barter trade zone with Indonesia, forcing Singapore to neglect 
the initiative. Another imminent Malaysian threat was the Singapore-Malaysia water 
agreement dispute. Despite the existence of the water agreement, Malaysian leaders often 
exploited Singapore’s water dependency to apply political pressure, threatening to shut the 
water supply off if disagreement occurred.100  
The next threat came from Indonesia, back then the dominant power in the region. 
Indonesia continued its Konfrontasi campaign by conducting sub-conventional warfare 
operations against Malaysia, which Singapore was part of, despite a negotiation for 
cessation of hostilities before Singapore’s independence. The Konfrontasi ended in 1966 
when General Suharto’s Indonesian army-backed, conservative right-wing forces 
successfully wrestled power from the pro-left-wing Sukarno regime. However, still, in 
1968 Indonesia posed a threat after Singapore hung two Indonesian soldiers, disguised as 
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civilian volunteers, for terrorism during the Konfrontasi campaign, when there was a 
potential of Indonesia to respond with military threats. 
2. Weaknesses 
Singapore, during this period, identified its two main deficiencies as lack of experience in 
the military realm and natural constraints. In terms of military capability and defense 
liability, the two Singapore Infantry Regiments (SIR) had many limitations and 
weaknesses: first, these units were commanded by British officers and were largely manned 
by Malaysians; second, these units were trained for defensive and internal security 
purposes, not for offensive and managerial purposes. The fact that most of the local military 
forces were led by British officers and manned by Malay Malays and Singaporean Malays 
caused a lack of military experience in the Singapore Chinese population. In general, 
therefore, Singapore had to build defense capacity from zero in almost every aspect, 
including defense planning, organizational power structures, doctrines, training, weapons 
procurement, and even culture. 
Structural vulnerabilities included demographics, lack of strategic depth, lack of 
natural resources, and geopolitical and ethnic complexities.101 First, Singapore had a 
demographic concern as it has a small population, and thus a shortage of manpower in 
maintaining its independence and securing national interests. Second, Singapore’s small 
landmass and territorial waters gave the small island state a lack of strategic depth, meaning 
that all of Singapore’s territory is the main point of interest that must be defended in any 
way. Third, Singapore’s natural constraints first stem from the fact that Singapore lacks 
essential natural resources. Conversely, its neighboring countries possess extensive 
resources as their economic base, especially in the agrarian sector. Lastly, Singapore has 
to deal with geopolitical and ethnic complexities, with its predominately Chinese 
population frequently being persecuted by the predominated Muslim Malay immediate 
neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia.  
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3. Strengths 
Following independence, Singapore experienced good economic performance, and it still 
served as a major British military base.102 Over the latter half of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
Singapore experienced high economic growth, even reaching double digits continuously 
from 1966–73, thanks to its geostrategic position, its efficient entrepôt service, and its 
investment-friendly policies. Despite the interrupted economic activity caused by its 
confrontation with Soekarno’s administration from 1963–66, Singapore rapidly stood on 
its feet and steamed up its economy. Singapore continued its industrialization efforts by 
setting up more spaces as industrial estates and promoting foreign investment through 
friendly policies, efficient infrastructure, and financial incentives.103 As a small island-city 
state, Singapore’s economic growth developed remarkably, as shown in Table 4. 
 Singapore’s Economic Growth 1962–1973104 
Year GDP ($US) GDP Per Capita Growth Rate 
1962 $0.83B $472 7.55% 
1963 $0.92B $511 10.04% 
1964 $0.89B $486 -3.10% 
1965 $0.97B $517 7.83% 
1966 $1.10B $567 10.18% 
1967 $1.24B $626 12.51% 
1968 $1.43B $709 13.53% 
1969 $1.66B $813 13.83% 
1970 $1.92B $926 13.94% 
1971 $2.26B $1,071 12.41% 
1972 $2.72B $1,264 13.32% 
1973 $3.70B $1,685 10.60% 
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Another of Singapore’s strengths during the initial phase was that, from 1965–68, 
its de facto external defense was still carried out by the British military, which still 
maintained its presence in its far east territory. As described by Tim Huxley, in the 1960s, 
“Singapore was hardly defenseless against external threats, given not only the close defense 
relationship with Malaysia, but also the massive British military presence.”105 Due to this 
extensive British military presence, Singapore was described as the “Garrison Island,” and 
there was no single aspect of Singaporean life untouched by the British forces’ presence. 
In fact, in this period, British military forces’ presence contributed to 25% of Singapore’s 
gross domestic product (GDP).106 The British stationed in the country its first-line combat 
aircraft, aircraft carriers, major naval combatants, as well as a submarine squadron. All 
these forces were supported with modern military facilities, from housings, logistics, 
workshops, training, and the most modern air defense systems.107 In addition, there were 
also Singapore’s local defense and security forces, consisting of two organic infantry 
regiments, the SIR; the Singapore Naval Volunteer Force (SNVF), a small coastal patrol 
force; the Singapore Division of the Malayan Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RMNVR); 
and the police force.108  
4. Opportunities 
After assessing its threats, strengths, and weaknesses, Singapore identified its 
opportunities, available courses of action. One opportunity was to maintain reliance on the 
presence of British forces to maintain security. This option was rational for a small ex-
British colony like Singapore, which could benefit from the British military experience 
with all defense investment liabilities falling on the British. However, due to the British 
forces’ reduction and withdrawal plan, this option was not viable in the long term. 
In addition, Singapore explored the possibility of utilizing its commonwealth 
connection in order to compensate its deficiencies. This option had the same advantages as 
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the previous one, Singapore’s small contribution of defense liabilities, since British forces 
would still be in charge. However, the participation of Malaysia made this option less 
viable for Singapore, as Malaysia was Singapore’s most likely adversary.109 Moreover, 
Singapore also experienced a bitter lesson from the British inability to mediate the conflict 
during Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965. 
Another opportunity Singapore identified was self-reliance. This option would 
allow Singapore to develop a force posture designed to address any regional threats 
independently, disregarding its constraints and unfavorable circumstances. It seemed more 
viable compared to the first two options. However, this option would require experience in 
the defense realm, which Singapore lacked, and a huge investment in acquiring modern 
defense systems. 
5. Singapore’s Initial Phase Strategic Planning Actions 
Singapore finally elected the self-reliance option and developed its strategic 
planning. The essence of Singapore’s initial phase strategic planning was the setting of a 
predefined security situation and future challenges, threats, and also the formalization of 
Singapore’s steps and plans to address the predefined security situation and future 
challenges.  
After Singapore conducted an initial assessment of its strengths and deficiencies, it 
looked for opportunities by seeking foreign assistance to help build up its military forces. 
Based on the idea that Singapore has to be able to defend itself, Lee Kuan Yew said that 
“in a world where the big fish eat small fish and the small fish eat shrimps, Singapore must 
become a poisonous shrimp.” This metaphor became the character of Singapore’s military 
forces’ early development and staked out the start of its indigenous military forces’ 
development direction. Dr. Goh Keng Swee, Singapore’s first finance minister, led the 
effort to develop Singapore’s military forces. Dr. Goh had his only military experience as 
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a corporal in the British-led Singapore Volunteer Corps until it surrendered to the Japanese 
Colonial in 1942.110  
Recognizing his deficiency—lack of knowledge in military matters—Dr. Goh 
sought “good advice,” as he did with Singapore’s economy.111 The decision to seek “good 
advice” was seen as a crucial step in the process of Singapore’s military development. 
Singapore turned to Israel, which wanted to be helpful to this newborn island-city state. At 
that time, both Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Defense Minister Goh Keng Swee 
believed that Israel, which resembled Singapore as a small country surrounded by Muslim 
countries considered threats, and with the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) well-known 
capability, could help Singapore to build its armed forces. After the withdrawal of British 
military forces that increased Singapore’s vulnerabilities, the Singapore leadership claimed 
that “In the view of the PAP leadership, dominated intellectually and politically by Lee 
Kuan Yew, an independent Singapore could ultimately find itself in a geopolitically 
uncomfortable position, similar to that of Israel.”112 His declaration attracted the Israelis, 
who agreed to help Singapore’s military by assigning its military advisers. In October 1965, 
they sent a high-ranking Israeli officer to assist Singapore in building up its military 
forces.113 The officer met Dr. Goh under great secrecy in order to avoid negative reactions 
from Singapore’s immediate neighbors.  
Singapore brought in the first wave of undercover Israeli military advisors in 
November 1965, who provided advice, training, doctrinal understanding, and guidance in 
the formation and initial development of Singapore’s military capabilities.114 The 
formation of Singapore’s defense forces was adapted, assisted, and advised, hands-on, by 
the IDF in the areas of recruitment and training, management capacity, and organizational 
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and operational capabilities, through defense documents called the “Brown Book” and the 
“Blue Book.”115 The Brown Book was an Israeli document of a masterplan for the build-
up of Singapore Armed Forces, created by an Israeli team of military advisers.116 This 
Brown Book was a document covering a broad scope of military strategy and doctrine. It 
contained a basic assessment of the influencing variables and the main solutions in building 
Singapore’s military strength, by building a popular army of conscripts trained and led by 
small regular soldiers. Therefore, this book also proposed to establish an “Officer Training 
School” to educate professional officers. From conscription, a people’s army would 
become the backbone of the regular army of Singapore so that the entire country could be 
mobilized in case of emergency. This Brown Book also included the details of the phasing 
and implementation of the concept master plan. This document continued with the next 
document, the Blue Book, which sought to establish the ministry of defense and intelligence 
services.117 At the same time, October 1965, Singapore established the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Defense (MID), with Dr. Goh Keng Swee as the first minister in position, who 
was previously Singapore’s finance minister.  
Based on Israeli advice, Singapore implemented what is now recognized as 
strategic planning. Its approach of formalizing and predefining Singapore’s future threats 
was guided by the Israeli documents, designed for building Singapore’s defense forces. 
The resulting 1966 Defence Plan envisioned the army’s ambitious expansion, which would 
be achieved in a decade through conscription.118 In February 1966, this initial step was 
followed by the establishment of the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI), 
formed to train Singapore’s military personnel, both non-commissioned officers and 
officers. Singapore predefined and formalized its future threats and plans in its confidential 
Defence Plan, which was finalized by September 1966. This plan mainly envisaged the 
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Singapore army expansion of twelve battalions in ten years.119 Singapore kept it secret 
until the detail was revealed two years later by the New York Times, as shown on Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. The New York Times article on Singapore’s 10-Year Defense Plan.120 
In 1967, Singapore adopted the IDF’s strategy of achieving security through 
deterrence, applying national services to all able-bodied young male non-Arab citizens and 
apply a strategy of forward defense.121 Because of Singapore’s limited population, its 
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military buildup competed with its need for labor to fuel economic development. 
Therefore, as Huxley wrote, Singapore chose to build a “citizen army based on conscription 
and long-term compulsory reservist service.”122 The National Service Bill was introduced 
in parliament in 1967; this bill stated that Singaporean men who on or after January 1, 1967 
reached the age of 18 years old were qualified to be called up for military service. During 
this period, only ten percent of those who qualified for the National Service would be 
assigned to function as National Service Force (NSF)—Singapore’s conscript force—
because at that time the SAF did not yet have enough facilities or military trainers. The 
first graduates of this recruitment served for two to three years as regular soldiers and, after 
ten years of training, as a reserve element until reaching the age of forty; the left out recruits 
were assigned as part-time personnel as part of the People’s Defense Force, a Singaporean 
unarmed Vigilante Corps, or the Special Police.123  
Just days after March 14, 1967, the day the Singapore Parliament passed the 
National Service bill, MID, along with Central Manpower Base, the recruitment center, 
began sending the drafting notices to more than 9,000 qualified young male citizens. Thus, 
Singapore successfully introduced the National Service, aimed to support the ambitious 
development of the SAF, which in the first year, meant to intake a conscription of 
18,000.124  
However, despite the National Service implementation, Singapore had a 
fundamental fear of neighboring countries, which could still jeopardize its domestic 
politics and economic growth. In response to that concern, Singapore’s sense of inferiority 
in being a Chinese population surrounded by large Malay countries, led Singapore to 
follow, for the most part, their advisers’, the IDF’s, guidelines for developing their military 
power. Therefore, Singapore sped up its military development even more using the 
strategic planning method based on guidelines made by the Israeli adviser team. 
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Singapore’s approach during this time can be considered top-down defense 
planning since SAF was ordered to adopt Israel’s military strategy, imposed by the top 
leadership in order to tackle any threats imposed by its neighboring countries. The SAF 
utilized its current capabilities and focused on strengthening its force. It benefited from the 
Israeli defense strategy, based on the concept of pre-emptive defense, which posited that a 
ferocious and strong military posture will be effective in preventing potential threats from 
taking shape.125 Therefore, Singapore utilized its balance of threat strategy that can be 
considered as the “threats and vulnerabilities” defense planning approach and developed a 
credible military force to nullify their neighbours’ future threats in attempts to defend its 
national interest.  
In addition, Singapore leveraged its position as an international trading crossroads, 
gaining recognition as the busiest port in the world as measured by the total tonnage of 
shipments handled annually.126 Hence, Singapore’s defense strategic planning and policy 
were developed based on the concepts of deterrence and diplomacy. As it viewed itself as 
non-aligned, trying to build friendly relations with all possible partners. Therefore, 
Singapore participated in many international organizations, for instance, Singapore’s 
participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).127 This plan was conducted to get international recognition as well 
as defend the state from any potential danger from its neighboring Malay-states.  
While it worked closely with Israel, Singapore still tried to maximize its 
opportunities by seeking any kind of benefits it could get from its former colonizer, by 
putting this option in the 1966 Defence Plan—for instance, the plan of building up the 
RSAF with the main combat force of 40 secondhand Hunter fighters and 12 Canberra 
bombers from the Royal Air Force (RAF).128 Other examples of taking advantage of every 
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opportunity, even benefitting from the planned-to-be-withdrawn British troops, are shown 
in the formation of the embryo of the Singapore naval force, the SNVF. It served sea patrols 
in the Singapore Strait on smuggling duties and the protection of fishing vessels and other 
small craft. By then Singapore had sought assistance from the British in creating the air 
force, as well as from New Zealand for the navy. Singapore’s utilization of the existing 
defense facilities, built by the British, was shown when the SNVF was assigned as the Sea 
Defense Command and moved from its old base in Telok Ayer Basin to a site at Pulau 
Belakang Mati (now Pulau Sentosa), formerly used by the British Army.129  
In sum, following independence in 1965, Singapore implemented a relentless 
process of strengthening its military. The potential regional conflict at that time, apart from 
being the main reason for the SAF development, could also have been a disruptive factor. 
Therefore, Singapore’s military capabilities had to be flexible and credible all the time.130 
Even though Singapore sensed its strategic uncertainty during the early development of 
SAF, it is clear that the sustainability of Singapore’s military development was helped by 
the nation’s political will, aided by the longevity of the regime in power since 
independence. Moreover, Singapore’s sustainable economic development and military 
development also portrayed its perception, i.e., its basic insecurity with respect to the 
threats within its volatile region.  
The opportunity of getting valuable support from abroad lent Singapore a fruitful 
time in establishing their defense posture. It had successfully taken the Israeli defense 
concept into account, formalized the predefined threats and future challenges, and adopted 
them in its strategic planning, the 1966 Defence Plan, during the SAF development in the 
1960s–1970s. By implementing the Israeli concept, Singapore expanded its military forces, 
received international recognition, and successfully ceased the potential threats. 
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B. 1G SAF (1970S–1980S) “POISONOUS SHRIMP” 
Successfully expanding its military forces, Singapore confidently continued its top-
down military modernization style, based on its 1966 Defence Plan, with predefined future 
assumptions and guidance, reflecting the application of strategic planning. The fruition of 
its education and training investment filled the SAF leadership with well-educated officers; 
therefore, during this period, the SAF also started to explore more flexible and innovative 
development concepts. 
The 1G posture was symbolized by Singapore’s leaders, as “Poisonous Shrimp”—
“easy to swallow but impossible to digest.”131 Given the SAF’s deficiencies at this point, 
the nation would be defeated in a war with any of its neighbors but would, in the process, 
inflict upon the attacking state’s armed forces a high level of destruction in what Tim 
Huxley, in Defending the Lion City, characterizes as an unwinnable war on its own 
territory.132 The idea was that, hopefully, the thought of suffering such numerous 
casualties would be sufficiently painful to deter a potential aggressor from attacking 
Singapore. To achieve this strategy, the SAF was designed to keep Singapore secure up to 
the shoreline’s edge only, so army development was prioritized.  
To that end, during the early 1970s, Singapore exercised its strategic plan of
expansion and acquisition, which was developed by the Israeli military based on 
Singapore’s geostrategic vulnerability and difficulties in securing its territory, as well as 
the Vietnam War. In accordance with the strategic plan, Singapore kept expanding its army, 
expanding its defense organization, and purchasing modern armaments, mostly from its 
allies, Israel and the Western Bloc. In this period, the Singapore Armed Forces began to 
reveal the structure and function of its organization, while still investing heavily in 
personnel education and training.  
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One course of action that evidenced the continuity of Singapore’s strategic planning 
implementation during the 1G phase was the Singapore’s army’s order of battle133 
expansion. During this time, the Singapore army grew rapidly, as planned and stated in its 
strategic plan, forming the desired twelve battalions based on conscription. By 1976, the 
Singapore army operated three reservist brigades, and SAF had enough soldiers to build its 
first army division.134 It was designated the 6th Division, while the second army division, 
the 9th Division, was formed two years later. By 1978, the size of the SAF had expanded 
four-fold compared to its 1965 posture.135 More quickly than the infantry branch, the army 
armored branch was formed in 1968, equipped with just a type APC, the Vehicle 
Commando Unit.136 The next unit included a more sophisticated system, the AMX-13 light 
tanks; Singapore purchased 200 units from the Israeli inventory surplus in 1969.137 Lee 
took advantage to exercise Singapore’s deterrence policy by ordering the AMX-13 to take 
part in the National Day parade at the Padang, in 1969,138 to which he specially invited the 
then Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman; as Lee described the tank parade, 
“it had a dramatic effect.”139 This deterrence grew stronger in 1975 when the SAF added 
63 Centurion Mk3 and Mk7 main battle tanks (MBT) from India. The fact that Malaysia 
and Indonesia had no MBT meant that the SAF modernization achieved its goals 
successfully as aimed by its strategic plan, in ten years. 
The second course of action that evidenced the continuity of strategic planning 
implementation during the 1G phase was Singapore’s willingness to secure its territory and 
national interests based on its spirit of self-reliance, which was the essence of its strategic 
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plan. In the training sector, Singapore began its next expansion in 1971, when it built Pulau 
Berani in Keppel Harbor as the site for a new naval base. At that time, the establishment 
of a technical training school and officers’ training school, as well as the expansion of the 
School of Maritime Training, which was renamed as the School of Naval Training, allowed 
the SAF to be well situated for patriating all training to Singapore without any foreign 
advisers. This achievement meant that SAF had moved a step closer to self-reliance, since 
it had depended on foreign assistance, in training its prospective forces in the School of 
Naval Training.  
The third course of action that evidenced the SAF and MID organization expansion, 
in accordance with Singapore’s defense strategic plan, was the 1966 Defense Plan. In 
August 1970,140 Singapore expanded the MID into two distinct ministries: Ministry of 
Defence (MINDEF) and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), which the Singapore Police 
Force (SPF) and the internal intelligence, Internal Security Department (ISD), came under 
the MHA. The assignment of SPF to internal security concerns distinguishes the 1G SAF 
from the SAF’s initial phase. This effort was followed by the establishment of the three-
armed forces branches as distinct identities on April 1, 1975 when the RSN was built as an 
independent armed service.141  
The fourth course of action that evidenced the implementation of Singapore’s 
predefined threats in warfare scenario exercises. Singapore’s most likely enemy, Malaysia, 
was always the main adversary in SAF warfare scenario exercise. The scenario for war 
with Malaysia has been played out repeatedly in every SAF exercise, as well as in its staff 
college wargaming, since the late 1960s.142 This scenario was based on the assumption of 
a requirement of SAF’s invasion of the southern part of the Malayan peninsula, establishing 
a “Mersing Line” or secure zone approximately 80km into Malaysian Johor territory.143 
This scenario came from various potential causes, from Malaysia shutting off Singapore’s 
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water source to the prospect of helping Malaysia to defend itself from Vietnamese 
aggression (Southeast Asian communist domino effect). However, at the same time, while 
it continued to implement its strategic plan, Singapore experienced dynamics beyond its 
strategic plan. Therefore, it explored the possibility of potential courses of action outside 
its formalized strategic plan. The Vietnam war led to security cooperation, and a manpower 
surplus led to more selective institutions and better military scholarship.  
The first way in which Singapore departed from its strategic plan during the 1G 
phase was security cooperation, which it pursued to address anything beyond its traditional 
threats. Singapore reconsidered the significance of its western allies, despite the 
participation of Malaysia, by maintaining its own participation in the agreement, which 
was not part of its strategic plan of self-reliance. Around the late 1960s, the regional 
dynamic, particularly the development of the Vietnam war, exceeded Singapore’s 
predicted challenges. Therefore, Singapore implemented an approach that, in retrospect, 
looks like the Osterwalder Business Canvas’s key partners block, a concept of innovation 
formulation, which emphasizes the importance of finding a more capable partner in order 
to overcome bigger challenges to compensate the British forces’ withdrawal: Singapore 
turned to its Western partners. Therefore, in 1971, Singapore joined the five 
commonwealth-based security partners and met in London to formalize a defense scheme 
for Southeast Asia before the British forces’ withdrawal. The meeting resulted in a joint 
communiqué called Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA; UK, Australia, New 
Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore), issued on April 16, 1971, which defined a new arrangement 
of the British Commonwealth to defend Malaya and Singapore, which was previously 
under the British responsibility. 
The second way Singapore departed from its strategic plan was the establishment 
of the foundation of the future innovation engine within the SAF. Around 1971, 
Singapore’s MINDEF established a study group, the Electronic Test Center (ETC), under 
orders from first defense minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee.144 As described by Teo Chee 
Hean, a former defense minister, the ETC group serves as a platform for the development 
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of Singapore’s “defense technology ecosystem” based on cutting-edge technologies. This 
group consisted of 5,000 defense scientists, logisticians, military procurement experts, and 
engineers working at MINDEF, SAF, the Defense Science and Technology Agency 
(DSTA), Defence Science Organisation (DSO) National Laboratory, research institutes, 
defense industry, and universities. This decision was also strengthened by the effort to 
nurture innovation through the SAF’s rigorous training program. Singapore experienced a 
surplus of manpower in the early to mid-1970s, such that there were a greater number of 
eligible NS registrants—32,000 recruits in 1976—than the SAF could use.145 Therefore, 
SAF only called the fittest and academically brightest; this policy also aligned with the 
SAF military scholar program.146 However, around the late 1970s, the SAF’s 
modernization contradicted the “Poisonous Shrimp” characterization and required a 
reformulation of Singapore’s defense doctrines. 
To sum up, despite the thriving critical thinking, SAF’s modernization during the 
1G phase cannot be separated from strategic planning, which emphasized expansion 
through quantity and acquisition. At the same time, Singapore also explored a possible 
departure from its strategic plan in response to the emerging dynamics. This trend would 
increase even more in the next phases. 
C. 2G SAF (1980S–2000S) “PORCUPINE” 
The 2G SAF transitioned from its “Poisonous Shrimp” character, which was 
criticized by the SAF’s well-educated officer corps, to the “Porcupine.” Despite the 
existence of the previously planned programs, the SAF successfully nurtured innovation, 
by encouraging and facilitating innovations even more, propelled by the thriving critical 
thinking culture among its officer corps. However, the well-functioning but inflexible 
military strategic planning inhibited innovations from turning into disruptive change. 
The first course of action evidenced the SAF’s nurturing innovation effort was the 
thriving critical thinking among its leadership. In this stage, Singapore’s heavy investment 
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in military personnel education paid off, manifested in the quality and maturity of the 
SAF’s domestic defense planning capacity and military combat capabilities.147 The highly 
educated military leaders, who openly criticized the existing doctrine and laid out future 
SAF development concepts based on measurable variables and strong argumentation, 
while encouraging the critical thinking culture, is a stronger indication of the existence of 
an “innovation incubator,” a good environment for nurturing innovation.148 The culture of 
critical thinking and the official efforts to nurture it began producing tangible results. For 
instance, when the SAF felt that the Poisonous Shrimp doctrine was deficient in addressing 
Singapore’s national defense efforts, such as when, on January 9, 1982, Brigadier-General 
Lee Hsien Loong, SAF Chief of Staff at the time, delivered his speech at the National 
University of Singapore: “If someone threatens to step on us, and our only alternatives are 
suicide or surrender, then there will be a very strong argument for surrender. So, we need 
a policy which says: ‘If you come, I’ll whack you, and I’ll survive.’”149 BG Lee addressed 
that the “Poisonous Shrimp” was a defeatist doctrine and unsuitable for Singapore’s future 
challenges. 
As a result, in the mid-1980s, the SAF explored the flexible approach—
innovation—by conducting experiments in the area of planning and implementing 
operations at the system level. The previous phase was based on quantity expansion. The 
shift is targeted to improve the capabilities of domestic military technology with the goal 
of increasing and maintaining the operational readiness of SAF units in the most efficient 
manner. 
The second course of action based on innovation was the support from Singapore’s 
legislative and executive branches, which consisted of retired SAF leaders or at least ex-
NSFs, toward nurturing innovation within the SAF. As innovation is not only about 
producing ideas, but also applying them in the field, innovative ideas were taken seriously, 
and most were implemented as SAF official doctrine. Around the1990s various academic 
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articles, written by SAF personnel, were published by the Pointer – Journal of Singapore 
Armed Forces, the SAF academic journal. For instance, as noted by Raska, journal articles 
such as “Application of Advanced Military Technology in Desert Storm” (Leong Sek Kay 
1995), “Revolution in Military Affairs and Command, Control, Communications and 
Computers (C4): Are We Ready?” (Lim 1998), “The Impact of Technology on the 
Military: An SAF Perspective” (Chen 1999), and “Joint Vision 2010: The Concept of 
Future Warfighting for the U.S. Armed Forces and its Relevance to the SAF” (Tay 1999) 
explored the strategic implications of advanced information technologies in combat and, 
more importantly, its impact on the SAF.150 These articles triggered an internal debate, as 
intended, which continued to the higher level, a debate between lawmakers and the SAF 
officer corps, and then ideas moved to the field experimentation level.  
An experimentation example was when the SAF developed an interest in the use of 
space in augmenting its existing C4ISR networks. In conjunction with the Nanyang 
Technological University and Surrey University and Surrey Satellite Technology, Defence 
Science Organisation National Laboratories launched a satellite project, it was Singapore’s 
first domestically designed and built.151 This satellite was not only designed for 
environmental monitoring functions but also provided a technological learning platform 
for future exploitation and use of Singapore’s military satellites. A potentially significant 
development was the June 2000 agreement for further participation in the development of 
Israel’s Ofeq satellites, leading to future operations by the Singapore Ministry of Defence 
(MINDEF). This project will likely enhance the SAF’s capacity to provide space-based 
surveillance and monitoring of the immediate strategic environment. Another piece of 
evidence was the Advanced Combat Man System (ACMS). Launched in 1998, the ACMS 
program aimed to “leverage cutting edge technologies as force multipliers to increase the 
SAF soldiers’ C4I, lethality and survivability, by symbiotically linking soldiers to soldiers, 
platforms and sensors, via a suite of wearable computer tactical communications and 
integrated weapons systems on the soldier.”152 Since the early 1990s, the military of 
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developed countries have begun to explore network-centric warfare and make it a major 
strategic imperative.  
The evolution of ideas into an effective doctrine can also be seen in the early 1990s, 
when the SAF followed the 1st Gulf War closely. Based on lessons taken from what 
happened to the Kuwaitis, the SAF emphasized the need for achieving a “swift and decisive 
victory over aggressors,”153 which led to a doctrinal shift, this time towards joint 
operations. The necessary precursor was a mature conventional warfighting doctrine that, 
at least in land operations, emphasizes the seamless integration of artillery, armor, infantry 
and other fighting services into combined arms operations.  
The third course of action that evidenced the innovation-based strategy formation 
was the implementation of what looked like the Osterwalder Business Canvas key partners 
block to find Singapore’s potential security partner. In the defense realm, which does not 
have a profit margin as a benchmark of performance or direction, the Osterwalder canvas 
helps invent the strategy a defense organization should take, especially in finding key 
partners. Singapore’s deficiencies forced it to rely on the assistance of other countries for 
its survival, which was not part of its plan for self-reliance. Nevertheless, it formed a 
bilateral relationship between Singapore and the United States, based on mutual advantage 
and common interest. In 1990, Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and the U.S. 
vice president, Dan Quayle, signed a memorandum of understanding to grant U.S. forces 
access to Singapore’s air and naval base facility, Changi.154  
The fourth course of action that evidenced the SAF’s innovation application was 
Singapore’s handling of the declining birth rate, with force optimization around the mid-
1990s. Beginning with the Army 2000 doctrine, the Singapore army’s derivative of the 
SAF 2000, completed in 1988, the Army was reorganised into genuine combined arms 
divisions, integrating not only armored and artillery forces with infantry brigades, but also 
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reservist (National Service) and active units. Army 2000 emphasized offensive combined 
military operations as well as the ability to perform a “24-hour battle.” This concept of 
joint operation was absent from the SAF strategic plan; however, this concept emerged 
from the SAF’s urgency to optimize its manpower due to the 1980s declining birth-rate 
dynamic. This was an innovative policy, but not part of Singapore’s strategic plan. This 
approach took place because the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) had successfully 
implemented a policy to reduce the birth-rate since the mid-1960s. The Singapore 
government was warned about this shortfall, as the annual National Service Force (NSF) 
intake fell from 32,000 in 1976, to 20,000 in the mid-1980s, to 15,000 in late 1980s.155 As 
Huxley describes, the main innovative initiatives are: 
• Commercialization of non-combat support services, such as supply 
bases and catering, reducing the demands on NSF manpower in 
those sectors. In addition, some support services were assigned to 
female regular personnel, non-uniformed SAF personnel, and 
civilian MINDEF employees. 
• Utilization of technology to minimize manpower requirements. To 
this end, weapons and other equipment were modernized, to benefit 
from technologically advanced weapons, and the use of simulators 
and computer-aided instruction was stepped up. 
• A restructuring of the army order of battle, with smaller formations 
and units maintaining their firepower and combat effectiveness with 
upgraded equipment. 
• Improvement of administrative productivity, through the use of 
computers and office automation systems. 
• Improvements to basic military training, especially in terms of 
reducing the attrition of otherwise combat-fit NSFs through training 
injuries. The systems for selecting officers (including non-
commissioned officers) and NCOs were also renovated. 
• Refinement of the medical classification system to allow the 
assignment to certain combat posts (as headquarters signalers, for 
example) of NSFs who would previously have been classed as unfit 
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for combat duties (approximately halving the previous annual figure 
of 3500 SAF NSFs who could not be given combat roles). 
• The provision of more challenging roles and responsibilities for 
NSFs. For example, NSF armored vehicle drivers are now cross-
trained as mechanics to allow them to repair their own vehicles. 
Some NSFs are now trained as middle-level “specialists” (as NCOs 
other than warrant officers are known in the SAF).156 
This force optimization policy was followed by increased interest and investment 
in the area of electronic warfare systems and the integration of advanced information and 
communications technologies to generate new concepts and approaches in command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) that would give the SAF the operational holy grail of “dominant battle-field 
awareness.” This idea could be traced back to one of SAF’s innovation articles—Lim’s 
1998 article—“Revolution in Military Affairs and Command, Control, Communications 
and Computers (C4): Are We Ready?” This aspect placed the SAF within an elite, and very 
small, band of cutting-edge military organizations capable of engaging in the so-called 
revolution in military affairs (RMA), first heralded by Operation Desert Storm. 
The fifth course of action that evidenced the SAF innovation was Singapore’s 
intention of benefiting more from its defense acquisitions, by gaining technology and skill 
transfer as well as saving Singapore’s foreign exchange by minimizing the country’s 
defense import. As Bilveer Singh argues, “defence industries are … the political industries 
of a country,” aiming to reduce dependency on foreign suppliers and to provide self-
sufficiency. He further argues that “one of the many responses of the PAP in overcoming 
the survival crisis was to establish a viable defence capability, and with that was implanted 
the seeds of the local defence industry.”157 Therefore, around the 1990s, fundamental 
changes took place in Singapore’s defense industry sector, first, in the form of privatization 
of the leading defense industry company, Singapore Technologies (ST), which 
dramatically reduce Singapore’s dependence on MINDEF defense contracts. This group 
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has obtained most of its business from the maintenance and repair of SAF equipment and 
attempts to produce non-local military systems, either through licensing or independently 
designing and producing military hardware. Although the military business remains the 
core business of ST, contributing 70 percent of its total revenue, there are joint efforts to 
expand operations in the field of civilian business. Furthermore, the ST has also begun to 
play an important role in facilitating the transfer of defense technology to the civilian 
sector; this is possible because of the large number of civil contracts it undertakes and the 
emergence of innovations and dual-use technologies. Also, before the privatization 
process, ST had begun to consider the profit potential of the defense industry sector, which 
was most clearly demonstrated in the export of weapons and equipment that were designed 
and produced locally. Excellent examples of such export success are the export contract of 
the SAR 80 assault rifle and the Ultimax-100 submachine gun and the Self-Propelled 
Howitzer 1 contract—called Primus—by the Singapore Armed Forces in November 
2003.158 The development and launch of Primus are the work of the consortium of the 
Defense Science and Technology Agency MINDEF, SAF, and ST Kinetics. Even though 
this benefit optimization was not part of the strategic plan, in the end, the ST group of 
companies managed to become an internationally recognized player in the global arms 
market, even though it was not as big as Israel.  
The sixth course of action that evidenced the SAF innovation, based on economic 
concerns, was the implementation of something like the “sticky note” concept in the 
Osterwalder canvas, in experimenting with the future potential defense systems, which 
mostly required a high cost, by experimenting with the less costly option. This innovative 
policy, which emphasized flexibility, was the RSN purchase of secondhand Swedish 
submarines, which provided RSN with an affordable platform to conduct organizational 
experimentation and personnel familiarization. In September 1995 the RSN announced the 
acquisition of an ex-Swedish Navy Type A 12 Sjöormen class submarine, to provide 
familiarization prior to building a future submarine force of up to six boats. In April 1996, 
the crew began training in Sweden and in July 1997, Singapore announced the purchase of 
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three more of the submarines. The first of the four arrived in Singapore in May 2000. 
Delivery took place after a comprehensive program of reconditioning and adapting for 
tropical conditions.  
Several other Southeast Asian navies had longstanding ambitions for operating 
submarines, but were overwhelmed by the cost and complexity. Singapore’s becoming the 
first to do so was notable for being an exception to its usual caution in introducing new 
technologies to the region and confirmed its economic strength, even as the Asian financial 
crisis unfolded around it. The introduction of the submarine arm confronted the Singapore 
Navy with several challenges, many of them personnel related, with implications for other 
aspects of its intended expansion. RSN took lessons from this and made improvements for 
the next submarine systems. 
However, despite the thriving innovation, Singapore also kept engaging with 
strategic planning, evidenced by publishing a 1995 MINDEF white paper,159 intended to 
serve as guidance instead of controlling the innovation, but it did prevent SAF’s 
innovations from being too disruptive. According to this defense document, “Singapore’s 
defense philosophy is not built on the premise of an existing external threat. Instead, 
Singapore invests in defense to enhance its deterrence capability. As a sovereign state, it 
must be self-reliant in its defense to prevent threats from arising in the first place. Total 
Defence is thus the cornerstone of Singapore’s deterrence strategy. It unites all sectors of 
society—government, business, and the people—in the defense of the country.”160 This 
defense document also explained the concept of a three-dimensional “S-Cube Concept”: 
“Survival, Security, and Success are the building blocks of Singapore’s future. The three 
elements are intertwined inextricably. Survival is the imperative of every nation. But there 
cannot be survival without security. At the same time, without success there will not be 
motivation to persevere.”161 
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The implementation of SAF’s Total Defence doctrine dates to its 1980s internal 
journal articles and its exploration of several similar strategies applied by Israel, 
Switzerland, and Sweden in the early 1980s—countries with relatively small populations 
which also implement a national compulsory military program.162 This idea was then 
introduced in 1984 by Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong in his speech “Security Options 
for Small States.”163 After much discussion and debate, SAF laid out a Total Defence 
system, as the result of self-critique, the Total Defence concept in this stage engaged in 
Singapore’s MINDEF. As Matthews and Yan argue, “The MINDEF is attached to 
technological prowess suggesting that it is essentially the unwritten sixth component of the 
Total Defence concept.”164 By implementing this doctrine, Singapore was able to propose 
five key elements of Total Defence. It consisted of psychological defence, civil defence, 
social defence, economic defence, and military defence. It was also underpinned by the 
fact that the SAF in the early 1980s had become “a practically unstoppable military force” 
compared to its regional counterparts, who were numerically superior but almost certainly 
qualitatively (in technology, doctrine, and training) inferior.165 This concept serves as 
guidance to all the SAF’s innovation and development. Therefore, the Total Defence 
restrains innovation, inhibiting it from becoming negatively disruptive. For instance, as 
Huxley argues, the MINDEF structures its procurement process in five phases—derived 
from the Total Defence doctrine—which includes: a five-year acquisition master plan, 
requirements definition, bid evaluation, in-service acceptance, and life-cycle review.166 
The existence of the acquisition master plan acts as guidance, that sets SAF’s procurement 
priorities, which automatically controls all changes in the SAF. 
In every sense, the cornerstone of Singaporean national security is the adoption of 
an all-embracing approach towards Total Defence, viewing itself as non-aligned, seeking 
friendly relations with all states. It actively participates in international organizations, such 
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as the WTO and ASEAN, and also serves as a rotational member of the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council (2001–22). Deterrence, the other aspect of defense, is rationalized 
on the basis that Singapore must possess the capacity to deter, in the event that diplomacy 
fails.  
Overall, the SAF experienced remarkable developments in doctrine, defense 
systems, and significantly in its culture. Its critical thinking culture, supported by the retired 
SAF leaderships who served at the government to nurture innovation, propelled the SAF 
modernization way beyond its neighbors. However, the existence of the 1995 MINDEF 
defense white paper, though intended to guide the thriving innovation, also inhibited the 
disruptive dilemma of thriving innovations. 
D. 3G SAF (2000S-2030S) “DOLPHIN” 
Despite the long discussion that preceded the implementation of the “Dolphin” 
phase, as Raska notes, the idea of the “3G SAF” officially came to public through the 
“Statement at the 2004 Budget Debate in the Singapore Parliament” by then Minister for 
Defense Teo Chee Hean on March 15, 2004.167 Raska also observes that the Dolphin phase 
aims to implement a transition towards a combined strategy of a multi-mission military 
force capable of carrying out functions “from defense diplomacy to kinetic integrated 
capabilities toward a wide spectrum of threats.”168 He also added that this phase 
“networked SAF, leveraging precision fires, maneuver, and information-superiority 
capabilities.”169 In this stage, Singapore has enjoyed the fruits of its investment in 
nurturing military innovation: innovation is everywhere, able to function in the RMA, and 
SAF has been categorized as the most modern military force in the region.170 Therefore, 
Singapore permanently institutionalized innovation by forming a dedicated institution. 
However, in the application of military innovation, the SAF seeks to balance, one, 
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maintaining proven strategies and structures with the adaptation of innovative operational 
concepts and, two, organizational structures based on RMA-oriented military-technology 
modernization in maintaining preparedness in the face of increasingly complex potential 
conflicts.171 
Teo Chee Hean, who was then the minister of defense, conceptualized this 3G phase 
as a form of gradual defense management reform, organizational and operational 
adaptation, which began from within MINDEF itself. He divided the SAF 3G 
transformation into a three-phase development approach: 
• In the first phase, the SAF would acquire new equipment, introduce 
progressively more capable systems, and establish new units to 
enable the transformation of the SAF into an advanced, networked 
force.  
• In the second phase, the SAF would set up new operational 
commands relevant with an expanded spectrum of operations, at 
home and overseas, and, in doing so, focus on widening its 
operational flexibility and responsiveness.  
• In the third phase, the SAF would aim on enhancing its leadership 
and human capital through the introduction of enhanced career 
schemes as well as revision of training and curriculum to maintain a 
steady stream of capable and committed people to meet the 
requirements of the 3G SAF.172 
The first indication of the SAF thriving innovation institutionalization in the 3G 
phase was when the SAF realized the importance of going beyond the competition with the 
existing foreign military doctrines and operational schools of thought, by thinking outside 
the box. Therefore, the SAF aimed to develop domestic military strategies and doctrines 
by encouraging its personnel to capture their thoughts in monographs. For instance, there 
were SAFTI Military Institute’s Pointer monographs: Creating the Capacity to Change 
(2003); Realizing Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control – IKC2 (2003); and 
Spirit and System: Leadership Development for a Third Generation SAF (2005).173 The 
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second monograph, Realizing Integrated Knowledge-Based Command and Control: 
Transforming the SAF, introduced the character of the main operational concepts 
underlying the SAF 3G: IKC2, which are “Network-Centric Warfare” and “Effects-based 
Operations”; 174 the first monograph, Creating Capacity to Change (C2C), represented a 
culture of critical thinking designed to stimulate internal debate in the SAF and, as such, 
enable the SAF to internalize a sustainable adaptive capacity into its structure and 
culture.175 However, there is an organizational challenge for MINDEF, and SAF, which is 
to maintain a hotbed of truly innovative ideas along with regular bureaucracies which have 
proven to function well.176 Room for change and continuity must be allocated because 
both are crucial to the success of SAF as an organization. 
The second clear indication the role of innovation engines in the 3G phase can be 
seen from SAF’s institutionalizing innovation—the creation of Future Systems Directorate 
(FSD) in 2003 and the Defense Research and Technology Office (DRTO) in 2006, which 
would serve as a “catalyst for transformational change within the SAF.”177 Another 
example was, Singapore’s Osterwalder’s canvas lookalike method for military purchases 
and concept of operations, which offers the flexibility of innovation—for instance, the 
RSAF F-35B acquisition program, which will buy an initial batch of eight fighters, perform 
experiment and adaptation, then buy a full squadron if the results are satisfying. Again, this 
approach provides Singapore with affordable consequences if something goes wrong. 
The third indication of innovation in the 3G phase was Singapore’s decision to 
cooperate with their immediate neighbors, who pose Singapore’s traditional threat. This 
decision to cooperate was not part of Singapore’s strategic plan, which focused on building 
capacity and capability to deter threats. The close proximity of Malaysian, Indonesian and 
Singaporean maritime boundaries and the numerous islands in these waters complicated 
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law enforcement efforts and the limited cooperation among the three maritime forces up to 
this time served to make the counter-piracy task more difficult.  
Nevertheless, through the 1990s, attempts were made to improve cooperation, with, 
for example, Exercise Eagle 12/92 involving the navies of Singapore and Indonesia, in 
Singapore and in local waters in December 1992. In early 1993, Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia convened a conference on Malacca Straits security and the upgrading of 
surveillance systems for the area. Piracy remained a significant threat until the middle of 
the following decade but the continuing evolution and improvement of multilateral 
arrangements had progressively greater effects, particularly in Singapore’s immediate 
vicinity.  
However, the existence of a less flexible strategy formation, one of a strategic 
planning character, can also be seen during this phase. One example is Singapore’s 
unchanged security perspective, particularly with respect to its defined vulnerabilities, its 
dependency on SLOC. As a key hub for transshipment, Singapore depended heavily on 
international trade, estimated in 1995 to be worth more than three times the national 
GDP.178 Singapore’s almost-total dependence on foreign sources for its essential needs, 
and particularly most of its water supply, is another significant vulnerability, which 
potentially will be disrupted to weaken Singapore during the conflict. Moreover, the 
Malacca Straits passage on which Singapore depends for most of its survivability needs 
must pass through its most likely adversaries’ territorial waters. Therefore, any minor 
disruption to Singapore’s SLOC would threaten not only its economic well-being but also 
its existence as an independent nation. While the RSN continued to eschew frigates 
publicly, the acquisition of bigger ships, possibly large enough to include a flight deck, 
became increasingly likely. One clear deficiency in the RSN’s capacity to assume the 
SLOC role, with or without maritime patrol aircraft, was a lack of embarked helicopters.179 
The RSN’s development was based upon Singapore’s highly tuned and increasingly 
sophisticated understanding of its strategic environment and the potential threats to the 
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country, which was defined in its strategic plan. As a tiny nation-state, it was both the 
beneficiary of geography and a potential victim. While Singapore’s armed forces could 
combine their efforts and share resources, the country would always lack strategic depth.  
The second example of strategic planning implementation was the prioritization of 
RSN development in the 3G Dolphin phase. This focus on the RSN was part of Singapore’s 
strategic plan, wherein the 1G prioritized the army, the 2G prioritized the RSAF, and the 
3G prioritized the RSN development. However, at the same time the RSN modernization 
also indicates the utilization of innovation, by acquiring the C4I capability, which was 
developed by the SAF culture of innovation in the 2G phase, in particular by the SAF’s 
academic articles and monographs.  
The expansion of the RSN could only have come at the expense of the Army or Air 
Force, at a time when Singapore’s defense effort was competing with the commercial 
sector for limited financial and human (especially technical) resources, one of the elements 
in the modernization of the SAF was the upgrade and progressive rearmament of the Sea 
Wolf class with Harpoon missiles in addition to their Gabriels. Most important was the 
acquisition of four E- 2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft 
from the U.S. in 1983. These aircraft could not substitute for much needed maritime patrol 
aircraft (MPA), but they provided a command and control foundation for devising 
coordinated tactics for the Air Force and Navy in long-range maritime strike.180 
A coastal design was selected ahead of an inshore type, indicating the RSN’s intent 
to protect not only the Singapore Strait but “the Malacca Straits SLOCs and the South 
China Sea.” The first minehunter, RSS Bedok, was constructed in Sweden, while the 
remaining three were built in Singapore.  
The RSN was already committed to considerable expenditures even if it simply 
replaced its combatants one for one. At this stage, the RSN intended to maintain the Sea 
Wolves into the early part of the next century while replacing the older boats with the same 
number of larger 57 m units with a new combat system.  
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The RSN had difficulty in retaining technically qualified people, while it also had 
career patterns that propelled the most talented to senior rank at comparatively early ages. 
This advancement policy ensured a dynamic and youthful leadership which could move 
on, after military service, into key national leadership and management roles, but it also 
strained the RSN’s ability to maintain high professional standards and an adequate 
experience base.181 Although there are no official documents provide the details of the 
plan itself, however the RSN development was part of the third phase in its strategic plan 
and Singapore carried it out. 
E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
To preserve the SAF strategic deterrent and maintain its superiority, the SAF 
decided to start a process of a never-ending modernization. It plans to acquire advanced 
military technologies and platforms, which cost a lot of Singapore’s fortune.  
Singapore’s intimate defense connections with Israel continue to the present. 
Singapore’s defense doctrine and current strategic posture are heavily influenced by the 
concept of Israeli defense. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, under the guidance of Israeli 
military advisors, SAF’s doctrine, training, organization, and equipment were developed 
appropriately to provide the basis for the strategy that was considered as the most suitable 
for Singapore deterrence through pre-emption in the immediate territory of Singapore. 
Then in the 1980s to early 1990s, the SAF completed building its limited regional power 
projection capability—specifically, the capability to protect Singapore’s vital maritime 
lifeline to 1,000 miles from its shoreline in the event of regional conflict.182  
Based on the separation of Singapore Police Force (SPF) from MID, which was 
part of the plan, this research proposes a change in the existing SAF evolutionary stages—
adding an initial phase called the 0G SAF, as described in Table 4. As cited by Michael 
Raska, Andrew Tan argues that there is a distinct period of SAF evolution, which was 
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Singapore’s initial military evolution, assisted by the Israeli military advisers, between the 
mid-1960s to 1970s,183 when Singapore’s military was merely characterized not as defense 
forces, but more as security forces due to its low scale, slow speed, and focus on internal 
threat; and also the SPF was still part of the evolution.  
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The table reveals that each of the categories, from the 0G up to 3G, used a common 
definition of threats, without describing which actor potentially poses the threat. It also 
portrays the prioritization (key focuses and services) and desired goals. In the strategy 
formation, the first three SAF generations (0–2G) mainly utilized strategic planning, with 
an early exploration of innovation, starting at 1G SAF, which then increased during the 
2G. The 3G marked the remarkable thriving of SAF’s innovation, not only among its 
officer corps but among its non-commissioned officers. However, the existence of SAF’s 
well-functioning and efficient bureaucracy provides several advantages in preventing the 
SAF’s innovation culture from being disruptive. Moreover, the application of SAF’s old-
school method also provides guidance that creates shared values among SAF’s personnel 
and continues through different generations. 
To sum up, Singapore’s achievement in modernizing the SAF was not brought 
about by strategic planning or innovation institutionalization alone but by the proper 
combination of the two. Singapore mainly utilized strategic planning until it reached a 
secure zone, outpowering its traditional adversaries, around the mid-to-late 1980s. The 
proper combination of strategic planning and innovation institutionalization successfully 








Singapore’s military modernization was initially driven by Singapore’s expulsion 
from Malaysia—which led to its independence and enormous efforts in safeguarding its 
territory and state from any possible threats, such as from Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Singapore’s military modernization seeks to build capable military forces, which can deter 
any potential threats. However, during the process, Singapore still felt insecure since it 
assumed that both Malaysia and Indonesia would impose their power against Singapore, 
whether politically or economically.  
Singapore’s natural constraints on its demographics, territory, and natural resources 
became the fundamental focus of defending the state. In its early independence, Singapore 
sought support from other countries, with Israel and the U.S. as significant supporters 
regarding its strategic planning for improving the army. The relationship between 
Singapore and the two countries are strong: even nowadays, the relationship between 
Singapore and Israel continues.  
During the early stages, Singapore implemented a predefined situation-based 
development—strategic planning—assisted by Israeli military advisers and by their 
guidance documents, the Brown Book and the Blue Book.185 In the next stage, thanks to its 
heavy investment in training and education,186 Singapore started to cultivate innovation 
through its military personnel, academically, through monographs and journals,187 which 
increased its modernization pace, backed by a nurturing culture of innovative ideas 
alongside SAF’s regular, well-functioning bureaucracy. In the current stage, its 
modernization pace is barely challenged regionally, propelled by the remarkable thriving 
of innovation within the SAF, due to its establishment of dedicated organizations that act 
as innovation engines. Based on these findings, the early period of Singapore’s military 
development showed a distinctive pattern that differentiated it from its neighbors. 
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Ultimately, the less flexible strategic planning method did help SAF modernization during 
its early period, then the flexible innovation institutionalization method took over gradually 
from the 1980s. In the 3G SAF, Singapore maintained its technological advancement 
thanks to innovation institutionalization. The combination of thriving innovation and 
Singapore’s well-functioning bureaucracy refined through early-stage strategic planning 
kept SAF innovation productive rather than disruptive and inefficient. 
To sum up, Singapore’s achievement in modernizing the SAF was not brought 
about by strategic planning or innovation institutionalization alone but by the proper 
combination of the two. It had the ability to maintain its well-functioning bureaucracy 
while it flexibly tried and applied more than one method of strategy formation, the 
combination of strategic planning and innovation institutionalization, for over than fifty 
years. Despite strategic planning’s usefulness in coordinating the whole organization, it 
comes with flaws and fallacies such as its inflexibility and the uncertainty of its predictions. 
Therefore, innovation institutionalization provides various advantages to compensate, such 
as its flexibility dealing with the uncertainty of future challenges. Singapore implemented 
strategic planning until it reached a steady or safe level, outpowering its most likely 
adversaries, then started to explore the innovation method.  
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
The main lesson obtained from Singapore’s military modernization is the 
implementation of a combine approach, strategic planning and innovation 
institutionalization, instead of one method alone. Singapore’s experience provides a 
reference for regional defense strategists regarding the implementation of various methods 
of strategy making in the defense realm, especially in military modernization. Moreover, 
Singapore’s modernization phases provide a benchmark to the regional military strategists 
to assess their military capability. From the early stage, every state should look for 
assistance and guidance from trusted partners who have more experience in the defense 
realm to assist in the making of defense strategic plans, especially the initial one. The state 
can start to explore a new method of strategy making when it has reached a safety zone, 
where it could mitigate the threat as it is targeted in its strategic plan. It can explore any 
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new method, such as a new method that emphasizes innovation institutionalization, 
thriving innovation through innovation engines. The unlimited potential development from 
the implementation of innovation institutionalization can be extremely useful. However, 
the disruptive behavior of innovation can lead to a drastic change, which can bring either 
advantages or disadvantages. Therefore, the proper implementation of some strategic 
planning is still required to minimize the drastic change effect by providing control through 
guidelines and coordinating the whole organization. 
B. 4G SAF (2030S-ONWARD) 
Singapore’s MINDEF started to envision the future SAF posture, the so-called 
“SAF 2030 Force” in 2015, inspired by the development of hybrid threats.188 Singapore 
intent to maintain its technological military superiority is manifested in the form of its 
future military posture, the 4G SAF, which no longer focuses on Singapore’s traditional 
threats. Although it was launched in 2015, it is all about the future posture, which envisions 
the operation of currently prototyped systems. For instance, this 4G phase explores the 
possibility of using a micro-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system for individual soldiers; 
a horse-like robot that can carry very heavy loads and follow soldiers independently; 
multifunctional robots; unmanned land vehicles (ULV); unmanned surface vessels (USV); 
cyber defense units; and other high technology that will be integrated into the existing SAF 
C4I system, which will improve its intelligence capabilities, as well as mobility, agility, 
and lethality.189 Overall, as stated by Singapore defense minister, Dr. Ng Eng Hen, this 
phase “would leverage a multilayered defense network of integrated sensors and shooters 
across all maritime, air, ground, and cyber domains with increasing emphasis on unmanned 
systems and platforms.”190  
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However, although this phase represents the SAF’s intention to adapt and innovate 
continuously, this phase emanates a huge potential for disruptive changes, distinct from 
SAF’s gradual 0–3G evolution. Moreover, Singapore’s natural constraints are unlikely to 
change. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCHES 
Singapore’s success story in modernizing its military, by combining strategic 
planning and innovation institutionalization, raises more questions that require further 
research. For instance, how to formulate the proper combination of the two? If there is an 
appropriate formulation, can it be implemented universally? 
Second, how effective the high-tech 4G SAF is at dealing with conventional threats, 
such as the South China Sea dispute and the conventional military threat from Singapore’s 
two immediate neighbors. This idea could be analogized as developing a computer virus 
while enemies are still using typewriters.  
Lastly, how might Singapore’s existing defense posture, culture, and strategic 
narrative adjust to and balance the consequences of the disruptive changes? Could 
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